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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Electric Vehicle - Smart Grid Integration: Load Modeling, Scheduling, and Cyber Security
by
Yu-Wei Chung
Doctor of Philosophy in Mechanical Engineering
University of California, Los Angeles, 2020
Professor Rajit Gadh, Chair
The modern world has witnessed the surge of electric vehicles (EVs) driven by government
policy worldwide to reduce transportation’s dependence on fossil fuels. According to [SL19],
the global EV market has grown sharply with the annual light-duty EV sales surpassing 2
million in 2018, which is about a 70% increase from 2017. The increase in EV population
implies the rise in energy demand, and that introduces new challenges to the electricity sec-
tor. EV charging load demand in high penetration scenarios, which is foreseen, may lead to
stability and quality issues in power grids. Generation capacity and the electricity infras-
tructure upgrade may be required to address those issues; however, it increases generation
costs significantly. The most common EV chargers installed today deliver around 7 kW of
power, which is over four times that of an averaged household power consumption in the
US. EV charging load often shows two peaks in a day, one in the morning when people plug
in the EV at the workplace and the other in the evening when people get home from work.
Without proper energy management for EV charging, the vast power demand due to a large
number of plugged-in EVs can stress the electric grid, degrade the electric power quality, and
impact the wholesale electricity market. Although an EV battery may store energy up to 80
kWh, which requires more than 10 hours to charge at 7kW from empty, we found that most
EVs need only 12 kWh per charge or 1.7 hours at 7 kW to meet daily commute requirement
while they stay in the parking garage for a more extended period. This implies that EVs
can have considerable time-flexibility for charging, and it is not necessary to start charging
right after plugging in, which is likely to result in the charging power add-up. A proper EV
ii
charging schedule can well allocate the charging load to prevent power peaks. Therefore, EV
charging scheduling can play a significant role in mitigating the adverse effects of vast EV
charging demand without upgrading the power grid capacity.
To optimize the EV charging schedule while satisfies EVs’ charging demand, each EV’s
stay duration and energy need are essential parameters for the optimization. Those parame-
ters are based on predictions to minimize human intervention. Nonetheless, the uncertainty
of EV user behavior poses a challenge to the prediction accuracy. Therefore, this disserta-
tion demonstrates an ensemble machine learning-based method to model and predict the EV
loads accurately, thereby improving the performance of EV charging scheduling.
On the other hand, this smart EV-grid integration, which requires massive communica-
tion, including collecting, transmitting, and distributing real-time data within the network,
makes it more susceptible to cyber-physical threats. Potential breaches could not only affect
grid operation but also reduce consumers’ willingness to adopting EVs over conventional
fuel-powered vehicles. This dissertation also presents the vulnerability analysis and risk
assessment for a smart EV charging system to develop the countermeasures to secure the
network. Also, while it is inevitable that the security has flaws, this dissertation provides a
novel anomaly detection approach based on the invariant correlations of different measure-
ments within the EV charging network.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The current electricity grid was designed to operate in a top-down structure. The single-
direction power flow starts from power plants and is then followed by a transmission system
and distribution system, and finally ends at the customers. However, increasing penetration
of Renewable Energy Resources (RERs), particularly photovoltaic (PV), in the distribution
grid has resulted in significant challenges for system operators who manage the grid. Fig. 1.1
shows the percentage of total capacity additions in the US over the past decade, and it also
shows the rapid growth of solar’s share of new capacity. 40% of the new capacity added to
the grid came from solar in the year of 2019 [Sol20].
Year Solar Natural Gas Coal Wind Other
2010 4 35 33 24 4
2011 8 51 10 29 2
2012 9 31 16 41 3
2013 28 46 10 7 9
2014 27 43 1 25 4
2015 30 29 0 39 2
2016 40 27 0 26 7
2017 31 42 0 24 3
2018 25 57 0 17 1
2019 40 32 0 27 1
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Figure 1.1: U.S. Annual Additions of New Electric Generating Capacity [Sol20]
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California has a significant renewable energy adoption rate among the United States, as
shown in Fig. 1.2 [Cal19, US19]. California has the largest solar market in the United States,
and 19% of its electricity today comes from solar [Sol19]. However, high solar penetration
also results in a new demand/supply challenge, known as the solar duck curve problem
[Cal16] shown in Fig. 1.3. There is an over-generation risk during the midday when the sun
is shining, and a steep ramp in the evening when the sun goes down along with increasing
electricity demand. The valley goes deeper when PV penetration becomes higher, and this
makes the problem more challenging. Flexible and controllable resources such as battery
energy storage systems (BESS) are needed to ensure supply and demand matching all the
time [NCP17].
Region Coal Natural Gas Nuclear Petroleum Biomass Geothermal
CA 0.3 46.54 9.38 0.3 3.03 5.92
USA 13 31 8 36 4.95 0.3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Co
al
Na
tur
al 
Ga
s
Nu
cle
ar
Pe
tro
leu
m
Bio
ma
ss
Ge
oth
erm
al
Hy
dr
oel
ect
ric
So
lar
W
ind
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 (%
)
Energy consumption by energy source, 2018
California United States
Figure 1.2: Comparison of energy generation sectors between California and the US as the
year of 2018
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The !rst ramp of 8,000 MW in the upward direction (duck’s tail) occurs in the morning starting around 
4:00 a.m. as people get up and go about their daily routine. The second, in the downward direction, 
occurs after the sun comes up around 7:00 a.m. when on-line conventional generation is replaced by 
supply from solar generation resources (producing the belly of the duck). As the sun sets starting around 
4:00 p.m., and solar generation ends, the ISO must dispatch resources that can meet the third and most 
signi!cant daily ramp (the arch of the duck’s neck). Immediately following this steep 11,000 MW ramp 
up, as demand on the system deceases into the evening hours, the ISO must reduce or shut down that 
generation to meet the !nal downward ramp.
Flexible resources needed
To ensure reliability under changing grid conditions, the ISO needs resources with ramping "exibility  
and the ability to start and stop multiple times per day. To ensure supply and demand match at all times, 
controllable resources will need the "exibility to change output levels and start and stop as dictated by 
real-time grid conditions. Grid ramping conditions will vary through the year. The net load curve or duck 
chart in Figure 2 illustrates the steepening ramps expected during the spring. The duck chart shows the 
system requirement to supply an additional 13,000 MW, all within approximately three hours, to replace 
the electricity lost by solar power as the sun sets.
Oversupply mitigation
Oversupply is when all anticipated  
generation, including renewables,  
exceeds the real-time demand.  
The potential for this increases  
as more renewable energy is  
added to the grid but demand  
for electricity does not increase.  
This is a concern because if the  
market cannot automatically  
manage oversupply it can lead  
to overgeneration, which requires  
manual intervention of the market  
to maintain reliability. During  
oversupply times, wholesale prices  
can be very low and even go  
negative in which generators have 
to pay utilities to take the energy. But  
the market often remedies the oversupply situation and automatically works to restore the balance  
between supply and demand. In almost all cases, oversupply is a manageable condition but it is not  
a sustainable condition over time — and this drives the need for proactive policies and actions to  
avoid the situation. The duck curve in Figure 2 shows that oversupply is expected to occur during  
the middle of the day as well.
Because the ISO must continuously balance supply and demand, steps must be taken to mitigate  
Figure 2: The duck curve shows steep ramping needs and overgeneration risk
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Figure 1.3: The duck curve shows steep ramping needs and over-gener tion risk [Cal16]
Distributed RERs have changed the electrical grid substantially. As Fig. 1.4 shown, with
more RERs distributed across the power system, there is a transition from a centralized to
decentralized topology. Because the RERs locally generate energy, single-direction power
flow in the distribution syste becomes bidirectional. The drastic changes in the power
system stimulate the rapid development of smart grid technology, which becomes a game-
changer for both markets and end-user players. Smart grid technology incorporated with the
Internet of Things (IoT), such as smart meters, smart controllers, demand response (DR),
results in the rapid digitalization of the power system. Therefore, there is a need for advanced
communication and control schemes to enhance system reliability and resiliency[SXC14,
SLC15]. Furthermore, the addition of communication, IoT, and Information Technology
(IT) has resulted in a significant increase in potential vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks on the
power sector, which is yet another challenge to the grid of the future.
3
Figure 1.4: Characteristics of traditional grid versus smart grid [Sto18]
1.1.1 Smart Grid and EV Integration
The emergence of Electric vehicles (EV) comes with the evolution of smart grids, with the
same goal to help the grid become greener. EV has great potential to significantly reduce
the usage of petroleum since the transportation sector is the biggest portion of total energy
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use [LL19]. There is a considerable expansion on the EV market in recent years, with annual
light-duty EV sales surpassing two million in 2018 worldwide, a 70% increase from 2017
[SL19, Lov19]. The cumulative sales of EVs globally are presented in Fig. 1.5. EV sales
by country vary worldwide. Widespread adoption of EVs is affected by consumer demand,
government policy, and market prices. The United States is the third-largest EV market,
and various government policies across the states have been made to support EV adoption.
For example, California has adopted the Zero Emission Vehicle regulation, which requires
increasing shares of electric vehicles through 2025. California continues to implement a wide
array of policies and is home to most electric vehicle sales. These policy actions include
consumer incentives, infrastructure deployment, information campaigns, and various local
measures. All of this is to overcome EV adoption barriers related to higher upfront costs,
functional electric range, range anxiety, and lack of awareness of the benefits [SL19]. The
United States EV new sales market share and forecast are shown in Table1.1. The table
shows the increasing trend of EV sales and the percentage of EVs in the US automotive.
The table also shows that California shares a significant portion of the EV market in the
US.
Top-selling light-duty plug-in EV global markets
China 2243.8
Europe 1346.0
United States 1126.0
California 523.0
Norway 296.2
Japan 257.4
United Kingdom 212.0
France 204.6
Germany 196.8
T e Ne herlands 145.9
China
Europe
United States
California
Norway
Japan
United Kingdom
France
Germany
The Netherlands
Thousands
0 450 900 1350 1800 2250
145.9
196.8
204.6
212
257.4
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1,126
1,346
2,243.8
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Figure 1.5: Top-selling light-duty plug-in EV global markets (cumulative sales through De-
cember 2018 by country/region)[Ort18]
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Table 1.1: US and California EV Sales & Market Share Projections [EVA18b]
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
US EV Sales 158,000 199,826 325,000 450,000 600,000 875,000 1,250,000 1,800,000 2,500,000 3,500,000
Total US Auto Sales 17,550,000 17,208,748 16,800,000 16,500,000 16,000,000 16,000,000 16,000,000 16,000,000 16,000,000 16,000,000
US EV % of Sales 0.90 % 1.16 % 1.93 % 2.73 % 3.75 % 5.47 % 7.81 % 11.25 % 15.63 % 21.88 %
CA EV Sales 75,165 110,000 200,000 275,000 350,000 450,000 600,000 800,000 1,050,000 1,350,000
Total CA Auto Sales 2,086,966 2070,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000
CA EV % of Sales 3.60 % 5.31 % 10.00 % 13.75 % 17.50 % 22.50 % 30.00 % 40.00 % 52.50 % 67.50 %
CA % of US EV Sales 47.57 % 55.05 % 61.54 % 61.11 % 58.33 % 51.43 % 48.00 % 44.44 % 42.00 % 38.57 %
CA EV % of US Autos 0.43 % 0.64 % 1.19 % 1.67 % 2.19 % 2.81 % 3.75 % 5.00 % 6.56 % 8.44 %
There is a concern with the sharply increasing number of plug-in EVs (PEVs) in the
distribution grid. The power supply may be insufficient to meet the additional EV charging
demand. According to [SBC04], the additional EV charging demand in the US will increase
the existing load by 18% by 2040. This increased load will eventually cause the degrade
of power quality, requiring a distribution infrastructure upgrades for mitigation. Fig. 1.6
illustrates the typical EV loads for three scenarios [fle19]. The study was based on the real-
world charging data from 650 battery electric vehicles over four weeks, representing 13,000
charging events. These account for 120 MWh to illustrate the wide variability of EV charging
behavior among the example service territories. For scenario (a) with no time-of-use (TOU)
rate structure, regular morning and evening peaks recur with commuting cycles to and from
work. Also, there is a consistent midday charging. This unregulated EV charging leaves peak
load to chance. For scenario (b) with static TOU rate, the variability of EV load is reduced
but produces an unintentional peak at the same time. The unintentional peak of EV charging
at 7 pm coincides with a shifted residential load such as cooking, cleaning, or HVAC. For
Scenario (C) with an EV charging control program, the EV load can be evenly distributed
along the day and aggregated within the period of a residential load valley between 12 - 3
am.
Therefore, there is a need for EV charging management. Also, the TOU rate alone is not
enough as it may result in coincident loads with the other shifted load like cooking, cleaning,
and laundry, which defeats the purpose of shifting this load in the first place.
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4PROFILE EV CHARGING  
IN SERVICE TERRITORIES &  
LOCAL NETWORKS
EV charging behavior within a service territory is as unique as your own 
ĆQJHUSULQW6ROXWLRQVXVHGWRPDQDJHRWKHUUHVLGHQWLDOORDGVDUHOHVV
effective when applied to EV charging. This is due to the large number of 
IDFWRUVZKLFKLQćXHQFH(9FKDUJLQJ,WLVDOVREHFDXVH(9FKDUJLQJURDPV
between the home, workplace, and public charging stations. Factors 
affecting EV charging include:
• home and workplace charging incentives, 
• pricing signals and rate structure, 
• climate/ weather, 
• FRPPXWLQJSDWWHUQVWUDIĆFFLW\YVKLJKZD\GULYLQJ
• total EV market share, EV model market share, 
• EV charge clustering, 
• public/ workplace/ condo charging infrastructure, 
• EV and EV charging rebates, and
• territory size and topography.
This chart illustrates the variability of EV charging behavior across three service territories. This example 
consists of charging patterns in service territories with a) no time-of-use rate structure, b) a static residential 
time-of-use rate structure, and c) a behavioral EV load control program.
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Figure 1.6: Three typical EV loads within a day [fle19]
EV charging scheduling methods have been studied through shifting EV load to off-peak
and aligning with renewables and over-generation by solar. The results have shown the
great potential to accommodate a large number of EVs and defer upgrading the electrical
grid [XWC18, WWN17, KCC18, KCG19]. Also, from the perspective of an electrical grid,
EVs offer an opportunity to provide ancillary services, such as DR, renewable generation
integration, or providing emergency backup power. These benefits can be achieved by proper
EV-grid integration. Therefore, EV has great potential to make an electrical grid more
reliable. Fig. 1.7 shows the schematic of EV-grid integration.
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Power Flow Wireless Communication
Figure 1.7: Schematic of EV-grid integration
Advanced communication scheme and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) are the key technologies to
enable the EV-grid integration presented in Fig. 1.7. V2G technology enables bidirectional
power flow between EV and electrical grid for EVs to support grid services. Monetary
incentives may be applied to motivate EVs’ participation so that utilities can achieve a
certain level of grid management. Given that V2G with rapid charging/discharging may
result in batter degradation, a study by NREL has shown that there is little to no impact
on the battery life if operating with a proper V2G control [KMM16]. [UJW17] suggests that
the optimal V2G control is able to reduce the EVs’ battery pack capacity fade by up to
9.1% and power fade by up to 12.1%, namely the battery life can be extended with this V2G
control compared to the scenario without V2G.
The dynamic electricity price is posted by an independent system operator (ISO) based on
the system-wide energy consumption so that the end-users can adjust their load accordingly.
Vehicle-to-Home (V2H) and vehicle-to-building (V2B) are also presented in Fig. 1.7. They
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can be achieved by applying smart charging control. It manages the charging/discharging
schedule to shave the load during peak hours, charge the EVs at low electricity price, or
serve as a backup power source during outages. Distributed EV charging stations have
great potential to facilitate renewable generation integration and enhance the smart grid’s
reliability. While RERs are largely deployed across the distribution grid, EVs can be utilized
as a distributed energy storage system to support voltage and frequency regulation and even
power compensation. These grid services provide benefits to the grid operator and the EV
owner and charging network operators through lower or more predictable charging costs.
1.1.2 Smart EV Charging Framework
This section takes a close look at the smart EV charging system. Smart charging allows EV to
be externally controlled for integration into the whole power system. Fig. 1.8 shows a smart
charging framework with potential communication protocols to be used. A charging point
operator(CPO) manages the EV charging points within the charging station(s) instructed
by a smart charging service. A smart charging service has a close relationship with the dis-
tribution system operator (DSO) and coordinates other CPOs, smart buildings, and energy
suppliers in the network. Smart charging service can be seen as an EV charging alliance
that brings together the CPOs in the network to achieve the grid management objectives
by optimizing the EV charging schedule. The more the CPOs participate in the alliance,
the more significant result can be made. In this scenario, a scalable charging scheduling ap-
proach is needed to manage a large scale of EVs, such as a hierarchical distributed framework
proposed by [KCG19].
The description of potential protocols presented in Fig. 1.8 is as follows. Open Charging
Point Protocol (OCPP) is an open protocol provided by Open Charge Alliance. It is
designed to standardize the communications between EV charging points and the control
center. Open Automated Demand Response Standard (OpenADR) is an open
protocol provided by OpanADR Alliance aiming at automating DR communication and
support a system or device to the change power consumption. Open Smart Charging
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Protocol (OSCP) is a protocol provided by Charge Alliance. The protocol communicates
the forecast of the available capacity from the DSO to other systems. It is based on a
budget system where CPOs can claim their energy consumption budget. Then the smart
charging service will accommodate the energy demand within the boundaries of the available
capacity. Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI) is an open and independent roaming
protocol for EV that makes it easy to exchange data provided by NKL Nederland. IEC
61850 is not a protocol but a document that defines communication protocols for intelligent
devices and electrical substations. ISO 15118 is an international standard between the
communication between EV and the charging infrastructure. It supports V2G and allows
the EV and charging station to dynamically exchange information based on which a proper
charging schedule can be (re-)negotiated.
Common standards for EV charging management and the integration of charging stations
and distribution networks is desirable due to the rise of EV penetration. Several norms
were published at the global level by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC),
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE). Main international norms related to EV in the aspects of connector, communication,
safety, and charging topology are summarized in Fig. 1.9.
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Figure 1.8: Smart EV charging system communication network
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Figure 1.9: Overview of main international norms related to electric mobility [IRE19]
The expanded communication between EV and the charging network in the grid will
improve the control of EVs and the integration of smart grids; however, at the expense of
creating a larger attack surface. Smart charging development must take cybersecurity into
consideration to provide a secure and reliable service.
1.2 Challenges and Contributions
It is shown that the electrical grid is undergoing tremendous change and in the transition to
a smart grid. The changes from a centralized system to a decentralized and unidirectional
power flow to bidirectional has made the power system more dynamic. As a result, advanced
communication and control schemes should be further developed to manage the system and
enhance its reliability. This dissertation focuses on the integration of EV into a smart grid,
in response to the rapid growth of the EV population. The first challenge for EV-smart grid
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integration is to accommodate the massive EV charging demand. To prevent the add up of
EV charging power from forming a huge peak, charging scheduling is necessary to relocate
the charging time according to each EV’s availability and energy demand. However, EV’s
availability and energy demand are unknown and may be acquired by prediction, yet the user
behavior uncertainty makes it challenging to be accurate. Therefore, the second challenge
is to handle the EV user behavior uncertainty. There is no doubt that a reliable EV-smart
grid integration requires smart charging. The advanced control and communication scheme
for smart charging has turned the EV charging system into an information network. The
enhanced control and monitoring of EV charging are at the cost of being more vulnerable
to cyber-attack. Consequently, secure the EV charging system from potential cyber-attack
becomes the third challenge.
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows.
1. A scalable smart charging algorithm is devised to manage EV charging with the ob-
jectives of reducing net load variance within a grid and lower the charging cost.
2. An ensemble machine learning approach is developed to address EV user behavior
uncertainty and provide accurate predictions to leverage the smart charging’s perfor-
mance.
3. A codified methodology and taxonomy for assessing vulnerability and risk of cyber-
physical attack on an EV charging network are carried out to create generalized and
comprehensive solutions.
4. A novel anomaly detection approach that makes use of the property of invariant cor-
relation under a controlled system is presented to protect an EV charging network.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows:
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Chapter 2- In this chapter, real EV charging data is studied, and the different charging
patterns are classified. Also, kernel density estimation, along with many commonly
used machine learning prediction approaches, are discussed, aiming at developing a
strategy to select the best prediction methods for different classes of charging patterns.
An ensemble machine learning algorithm is proposed to leverage the performance of
EV charging scheduling.
Chapter 3- In this chapter, a scalable and straightforward EV charging scheduling algorithm
is presented, taking into consideration of dynamic electricity price, solar generation,
and building load. The approach incorporates the prediction method introduced in
Chapter 2 and minimizes the net load variance and charging cost for an EV charging
network.
Chapter 4- In this chapter, comprehensive vulnerability analysis and risk assessment for
the WinSmartEVTM charging system on the UCLA campus is demonstrated. Several
potential failure scenarios for the charging system were defined, and the impacts of
potential cyber-physical attacks have been studied. Moreover, a codified methodology
and taxonomy are provided for creating a generalizable and comprehensive solution.
Chapter 5- In this chapter, the concept of invariant correlation network is introduced, and
the Greedy Gaussian Segmentation (GGS) method is applied to capture the system-
wise correlations for the EV charging system. The anomaly detection method is then
developed to detect the correlation changes that infer potential cyber-attack or mali-
cious data injection.
Chapter 6- This chapter concludes the dissertation and discusses the future direction of
method improvements.
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CHAPTER 2
EV Load Modeling and Prediction
2.1 Overview
Electric vehicles (EVs) have received more and more attention since they became an essential
part of a smart grid. This is not only because they are environmentally friendly but also
because they provide an economical option to people, considering the high price of dwindling
fossil fuels. According to InsideEVs ’ statistical report for 2018, around 361 thousand EVs
sold in the US while 2 million in total worldwide, and the numbers almost doubled in
comparison to that in 2016 [Lov19]. Currently, there are over 614 thousand EVs on the
road in California[Vel19], spurred by the government’s zero-emission vehicle mandate to
achieve the goal of accommodating 1.5 million EVs by 2025 (California Executive Order B-16-
2012). Therefore, a sharply increasing number of EVs on the road is foreseen. However, the
increasing number of EVs also means that the rise of energy demand and is now becoming a
challenge to the electrical grid. Based on the EV charging data collected on the University of
California, Los Angeles (UCLA) campus, the average energy consumption is about 8 kWh per
charge, which is similar to a daily household energy demand. EV charging load often shows
two peaks in a day, one in the morning when people plug in the EV at the workplace and the
other in the evening when people get home from work. Without proper energy management
for EV charging, the huge power demand due to a large number of plugged-in EVs can stress
the distribution grid, degrade the power quality [MWJ14, SIF15], and impact the wholesale
electricity market [FTC13]. The AAA Foundation report reveals that US drivers spend only
0.8 hours in average behind the wheel everyday [Joh18] and mostly leave vehicles parked.
This implies that EVs can have a great flexibility for charging and is it not necessary to
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start charging right after plugged-in. Thus EV charging scheduling plays an important role
in distributing and allocating the charging time according to the EVs’ availability for overall
load management. A proper EV load management not only mitigates the adverse effects of
EV charging but also brings benefits to the grid such as load valley filling and peak shaving
[GTL13]. Also EV as a mobile battery has a potential to participate in electricity market
[KCM11]. Yet the stochasticity of EV user charging behaviors, including start time, stay
duration, and energy demand, poses a significant challenge for the management of charging
scheduling. Therefore, this chapter discusses and compares several commonly used prediction
methods, aiming at developing an accurate predicting model for EV user behavior in order to
improve energy management performance. In addition, since the predicting methods, such
as regression or kernel density estimator (KDE) are based on the historical data and the
historical charging patterns may be very different from each other, there is no one-size-fits-
all predicting method for all different EV users. Thus, this chapter analyzes and classifies
the different charging patterns, and uses different predicting algorithms accordingly.
2.2 Literature Review
Forecasting EV load and it’s impact to a distribution grid has recently been brought to light
by the development of smart grids and the growing number of EVs. However, due to limited
access to real EV charging data, synthetic data from travel surveys are used for the majority
of these studies. Gennaro et al. [GPS14] utilized the data collected from conventional fuel
vehicles. Harris et al. [HW14] synthesized EV charging profile by using vehicle trip data
from the National Household Travel Survey (NHTS). Wang et al.[WZO15] simulated EV
energy consumption using car travel survey. In spite of the early stage of EV adoption, some
utilities and aggregators have been collecting data from charging stations to gain insight
into EV user behavior [Sma, XWC18]. EA Technology[Eat16] have conducted a three year
project to collect data and investigate the impact of clusters of EVs on the electrical grid in
the UK. There are two types of data can be used for the forecasting, which are station record
and charging record. Station record comes directly from the measurement at the charging
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outlets while charging record comes from the measurement of each user’s charging session. In
other words, station record is the aggregated load data over time and charging record is the
data for a specific user during a charging session. In [MQC15], multiple methods including a
k-nearest neighbor (KNN), a lazy-learning algorithm and a pattern sequence algorithm have
been evaluated for aggregated EV load estimation. In [AKK16, WHQ15], an autoregressive
integrated moving average (ARIMA) method has been proposed for aggregated EV load
forecasting. In [XMC16], a data mining model was developed to predict EV charging demand
for a geographical area. In [MQC14], modified pattern-based sequence forecasting (MPSF)
was in comparison with KNN, support vector regression (SVR) and random forest (RF)
algorithms and showed more accurate performance. Also, the aggregated data of EV loads
may be used for coordinating the EV charging operation as in [XHS14]. However, to schedule
the charging when EVs are plugged in, the charging parameters in each session are preferred
instead of the aggregated load information. Furthermore, the prediction by aggregated load
requires a large amount of EV charging data and currently the availability of the data is
limited. The author in [MQC16] discussed EV charging load forecasting by using station
records and charging records, and the results showed that charging record based prediction
is faster and more accurate. The method such as Gaussian-based kernel density estimator
(GKDE) has been applied to handle the uncertainties of user behaviors for each charging
session in [WWN17, WSW17, WRW16]. But the use of optimal bandwidth selection for
GKDE, a.k.a the normal reference rule [Sil86], usually leads to an over-smoothed probability
and results in less accurate prediction. To overcome the deficiency of the normal reference
rule, kernal density estimation via diffusion (DKDE) [BGK10], which provides a better
bandwidth selection approach, has been used to improve the prediction accuracy of EV
charging behavior[KCC18, CKC18]. By examining the performance of the algorithms applied
to EV user behavior prediction, it is noted that the variances of the errors are usually large.
This is because the EV charging patterns vary significantly and there is no unique algorithm
that works for all. [CKC18] compares and discusses DKDE and GKDE, and the the result
shows that DKDE has a higher accuracy for the users who charge their EVs regularly while
GKDE works better for the irregulars. However, the overall performance for the prediction
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still has room for improvement. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no effective
feature that can categorize different EV charging patterns associated with the most accurate
predicting algorithms. Therefore, this chapter aims at classifying different charging patterns
and uses the best approach to predict the charging behavior in each classification.
2.3 User Behavior Prediction Model
This section describes the method for EV user behavior prediction. The objective is to
predict each specific EV user’s stay duration and energy demand based on their historical
charging data when they plug in their EVs. For each charging session, a 5-tuple of parameters
is used to describe a charging behavior:
s , (uid, ts, td, dw, e), (2.1)
where uid is the unique identifier (user ID) for each user in our system; ts and td denote
start time and stay duration, respectively; dw denotes day of week ; and e denotes energy con-
sumption. Those charging parameters are of vital of importance for EV charging scheduling
algorithms to determine an optimal solution. To be specific, once a user initiates a charg-
ing session, the predictions of stay duration and energy consumption are required for the
scheduling services to determine energy allocation schedule. It is noted that stay duration is
related to start time and day of week since users in our model may have their fixed weekly
working schedules. Therefore, the prediction of stay duration(t̂d) can be expressed as follows:
t̂d = fd(ts, dw). (2.2)
Also, energy consumption is related to start time, day of week, and stay duration, such that:
ê = fe(ts, dw, t̂d). (2.3)
As shown in (2.3), when predicting energy consumption, the stay duration is unknown and
thus rely on its predicted value, t̂d. The predicting procedure is illustrated in Fig. 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: User behavior prediction
To evaluate the performances of different prediction algorithms, symmetric mean absolute
percentage error (SMAPE) is chosen here based on the following reasons:
1. SMAPE is a unit free percentage error and it is easier to present the prediction accuracy
with different data sets, which are stay duration and energy consumption in this paper.
2. Percentage error such as mean absolute percentage error (MAPE, defined as MAPE =
mean (|y − yˆ|/y)) has a problem when y value becomes very small. This small value
will result in a huge error that bias the overall accuracy. Therefore, SMAPE would be
more accurate since it considers both y and yˆ in the denominator, given that the data
is strictly positive.
3. SMAPE is widely used in evaluating EV charging prediction accuracy, it would be
easier for comparison.
For charging session i, the SMAPE is defined as:
SMAPE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|Pˆ (i)− T (i)|
Pˆ (i) + T (i)
, (2.4)
where N is the number of charging sessions, Pˆ is the prediction, and T is the corresponding
true value.
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2.4 Hybrid Kernel Density Estimator (HDKE)
This section presents a hybrid kernel density estimator (HKDE) that uses both Gaussian-
and Diffusion-based KDE (GKDE and DKDE) to predict the stay duration and charging
demand of electric vehicles (EVs), which are essential parameters for optimizing EV charging
schedule. While DKDE has higher accuracy in general, GKDE tends to result in better
estimation for users who charge the EV irregularly. Therefore, the HKDE evaluates and
categorizes the charging pattern regularity of a user, and determines which KDE to use by
a novelty detection method based on the users historical data. The estimations are then
applied to an optimal EV charging algorithm to minimize load variance in an EV charging
infrastructure and reduce EV charging cost.
2.4.1 Gaussian Kernel Density Estimator (GKDE)
KDE is widely used as a nonparametric distribution estimation method. Given an ob-
served dataset X = [X1, X2, ..., XN ], a probability density function can be estimated as
follows[Cri16]:
PˆKDE (x) =
1
Nh
N∑
i=1
K(
x−Xi
h
) (2.5)
where N is the size of X, h is the bandwidth of the Gaussian kernel K(·), and K(·) is defined
as:
K (u) =
1√
2pi
e(−
1
2
u2) (2.6)
Bandwidth h defines the shape of the kernel function and thus is a deterministic factor to
the performance of the estimator. A large h oversmoothes the density function that masks
the structure of data while a small h generates a spiky one that makes the interpretation
difficult. It is desired to find a value of h that minimizes the error between the estimated
density and the true density. However, there is a bias-variance trade-off for the bandwidth
selection, which means a large bandwidth reduces the variance of PˆKDE(x) but increases the
bias with respect to the true density. On the other hand, a small bandwidth decreases the
bias of PˆKDE(x) at the expense of larger variance. Silverman’s rule of thumb [Sil86], also
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known as the normal reference rule, provides a simple solution for the optimal bandwidth,
with the assumption that the true density has Gaussian normal distribution. The optimal
bandwidth determined by the normal reference rule is as follows:
h∗ ∼= 1.06σN− 15 , (2.7)
where σ is the sample standard deviation of N training examples.
However, this method usually leads to an over-smoothed result in multimodal models
such as EV user charging behaviors.
2.4.2 Kernel Density Estimator via Diffusion (DKDE)
Different from the normal reference rule, the optimal bandwidth can be derived from the
observed dataset X using an improved plug-in method introduced in[BGK10].
The kernel density (2.5) can be expressed in an alternative form:
fˆX (x; y) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
φ (x,Xi; y), (2.8)
where
φ (x,Xi; y) =
1√
2piy
exp(−(x−Xi)
2
2y
), (2.9)
in which
√
y = h is defined as in (2.5).
The main observation is that GKDE (2.8) is the unique solution to the Fourier heat
equation as follows [BGK10]:
∂
∂y
fˆ (x; y) =
1
2
∂2
∂x2
fˆ (x; y) , x ∈X , y > 0, (2.10)
with initial condition:
fˆ (x; 0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ (x−Xi), (2.11)
where fˆ (x; 0) represents the empirical density of X, and δ(x−Xi) is the Dirac measure at
Xi. The Neumann boundary condition to solve the diffusion equation (2.10) is as follows:
∂
∂y
fˆ (x; y)
∣∣∣
x=1
=
∂
∂y
fˆ (x; y)
∣∣∣
x=0
= 0. (2.12)
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Exploiting the link between GKDE and Fourier heat equation, finding the optimal bandwidth
of (2.8) is equivalent to finding the optimal mixing time y∗ of the diffusion process governed
by (2.10). Considering those conditions and the finite domain [0, 1], the analytical solution
of (2.10) is obtained by:
fˆdiff (x; y
∗) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
κ (x,Xi; y
∗) , x ∈ [0, 1], (2.13)
in which the kernel function is given by:
κ (x,Xi; y
∗) =
∞∑
k=−∞
φ (x, 2k +Xi; y
∗) + φ (x, 2k −Xi; y∗), x ∈ [0, 1], (2.14)
and it is equivalent to:
κ (x,Xi; y) =
∞∑
k=−∞
e−k
2pi2y/2cos(pix)cos(piXi). (2.15)
Although both estimators (2.8) and (2.13) behave similarly in the interior of the domain
[0,1] for a small bandwidth, (2.13) performs better near the boundaries where x = 0, 1. The
reason is that DKDE is consistent with the true density while GKDE is inconsistent at the
boundaries.
The optimal bandwidth can be expressed as follows:
y∗ =
(
6
√
2− 3
7
)2/5
γ[l](y), (2.16)
in which
γ[l](y) = γ1(γ2(· · · γl(y) · · · )), l ≤ 1, (2.17)
and
γl(y) =
((
1 + (1/2)(l+1/2)
)
(1× 3× · · · (2l − 1))
3N
√
pi/2 ‖ fˆ (2)diff ‖2
)2/(3+2l)
, (2.18)
where l = 5 in this paper as recommended by [BGK10].
2.4.3 Implementation of HKDE
Here the one-class SVM for novelty detection according to Scho¨lkopf[SWS00] is deployed
to examine how different a test data is from the corresponding training data. Considering
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Figure 2.2: One-class SVM
a dataset x = {x1, x2, ..., xn}, the kernel function maps all the data points into a feature
space, and the one-class SVM generates a hyperplane, which serves as a decision boundary,
to separate them from the origin while maximizing the distance from this hyperplane to the
origin. This leads to a binary function f which returns +1 in a small region capturing most
of the training data points, and −1 elsewhere. The schematic figure of one-class SVM is
illustrated below in Fig. 2.2.
The following quadratic programming minimization function is used to separate the data
set from the origin:
min
w,ξi,ρ
‖w‖2
2
+
1
νn
n∑
i=1
ξi − ρ (2.19a)
s.t. (w · φ (xi)) ≥ ρ− ξi & ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n (2.19b)
where w is the normal vector to the hyperplane, φ (xi) is the transformation function of xi,
ρ ∈ R is a bias, ξi is the slack variable. ν ∈ [0, 1] characterizes the fractions of support vectors
(SVs) and outliers. More specifically, ν sets an upper bound on the fraction of outliers and
lower bounds on the number of training data points used as SV.
The minimization problem can be solved by Lagrange multipliers and the decision rule
shown below:
f (x) = sgn ((w · φ (xi))− ρ) = sgn
(
n∑
i=1
αiK (x, xi)− ρ
)
(2.20)
where αi is the Lagrange multiplier, and K (x, xi) = φ (x)
T φ (xi) is the kernel function, and
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in this paper, Gaussian radial basis function (RBF) is used:
K (x, xi) = e
− ‖x−xi‖
2
2σ2 (2.21)
where σ ∈ R is the kernel parameter.
To have high accuracy predictions, determining the parameter ν in (2.19) and the thresh-
old for the HKDE is paramount. ν in the range [0.1, 0.7] is examined to find the optimal
one which minimizes prediction error. To determine the threshold, 20-month EV charging
data collected from 55 users on UCLA campus as well as 52 users’ charging data from EA
Technology [Eat16] is analyzed, of which 60% is for training set, 20% for the validation set
and 20% for the test set. For each user’s data, both GKDE and DKDE are applied, and
the errors are calculated using the validation set. Novelty detection using the Scikit-learn
framework[PVG11] is utilized to find the out-of-class rate (OCR) for the training set and
validation set, called TOCR and VOCR, respectively. OCR is defined as the number of data
points that is out of the classification over the total number, according to the decision rule
shown in (2.20). The difference between TOCR and VOCR, called DOCR, is defined in
(2.22), which its optimal value is the threshold minimizing the HKDE error.
DOCR =
V OCR− TOCR
TOCR
(2.22)
Once the optimal values of ν (ν∗) and threshold (DOCR∗) are determined by the pro-
cedure shown in Algorithm 1, the proposed HKDE is able to select an appropriate KDE for
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each EV user in the system.
Algorithm 1: Calculation of DOCR∗ and ν∗
1 Initialization:
• Retrieve historical charging data
• Separate the data into training and validation set
2 for ν ∈ [0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.7] do
3 STEP.1: Record the errors of GKDE and DKDE, and calculate DOCR
4 for UserID = 1 : N do
5 Calculate the errors of GKDE, DKDE
6 Apply one-class SVM and calculate DOCR (2.22)
7 end
8 STEP.2: HKDE Test
9 for r ∈ [DOCRmin, ..., DOCRmax] do
10 for UserID = 1 : N do
11 if user’s DOCR ≤ r then
12 DKDE
13 else
14 GKDE
15 end
16 end
17 Calculate HKDE error
18 end
19 Threshold = DOCR∗
20 Evaluate the errors of GKDE, DKDE and HKDE
21 end
22 Determine ν∗
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Figure 2.3: Schematic overview of the proposed HKDE.
As Fig. 2.3 shows, when a vehicle plugs in, the EV charging system recognizes the vehicle,
and the proposed HKDE predicts its stay duration and energy consumption.
2.4.4 Results and Discussion
Regular and irregular charging patterns are identified by the novelty detection as shown in
Fig. 2.4. Learned frontier is the boundary of the classification, which is the hyperplane in
the feature space, and the color bar shows the mapping distance in the feature space to this
hyperplane. The regular user starts charging the EV around 10 am to 12 pm or earlier at
7am regularly, and the stay duration is around 4 hours. In contrast, for the irregular users,
the start time and stay duration vary along the axes, and most of the validation data points
are located outside of the frontier.
The value of ν∗ for equation (2.19) is determined by Algorithm 1, and the result shows
that ν∗ = 0.4 as demonstrated in Fig. 2.5. Some charging events with small value of
duration or energy consumption can produce very large errors and skew the overall error
rate. Therefore, symmetric mean absolute percentage error (SMAPE) is used to mitigate
the influence of those small values and evaluate the prediction errors. Since the number of
charging sessions varies in each test day, SAMPE is modified to fit the use case as shown in
the following:
SMAPE =
1
Nd
Nd∑
i=1
1
Ei
Ei∑
j=1
|T ij − Pˆ ij |
T ij + Pˆ
i
j
× 100% (2.23)
26
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Start Time (hr)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
D
ur
at
io
n 
(h
r)
TOCR = 110/273 
VOCR = 5/32 
learned frontier
training set
validation set
0 5 10 15 20
Start Time (hr)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
TOCR = 172/432 
VOCR = 47/65 
learned frontier
training set
validation set
Close
Medium
Far
Figure 2.4: EV user behaviors under novelty detection analysis. Left: regular user; :Right:
irregular user.
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Figure 2.5: SMAPE of stay duration with different values of ν.
WhereNd is the total number of days that is evaluated, Ei is total number of charging sessions
in the i-th day, Pˆ ij is the j-th prediction value of i-th day, and T
i
j is the corresponding actual
value, i.e. the true value of stay duration or energy consumption.
The proposed HKDE predicts the charging parameters when an EV plugs in. Fig. 2.6 and
Fig. 2.7 show the prediction errors of stay duration and energy consumption, respectively,
using the test dataset for each user. The proposed HKDE selects the KDE with smaller
error for predicting charging behavior in the most cases.
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Figure 2.6: SMAPE of stay duration.
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Figure 2.7: SMAPE of energy consumption.
Mean estimation deviation (MED) in (2.24) is also defined to assess the overall accuracy
for the predictions.
MED =
1
Nuser
Nuser∑
i=1
√√√√ 1
Ni
Ni∑
j=1
(Pˆ (j)− T (j))2
 , (2.24)
where Nuser is the number of users, Ni is the number of charging sessions for the i-th user,
Pˆ is the prediction, and T is the corresponding true value. For HKDE, the prediction MED
for stay duration is 1.42 hour, and for energy consumption is 3.38 kWh. Table 2.1 shows the
comparison of MED among GKDE, DKDE and HKDE.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of prediction MED.
Stay Duration (hr) Energy Consumption (kWh)
GKDE 1.93 4.96
DKDE 1.44 3.84
HKDE 1.42 3.38
2.5 Ensemble Machine Learning Method
This section investigates electric vehicle (EV) charging behavior and aims to find the best
method for its prediction in order to optimize the EV charging schedule. Here we discusses
several commonly used machine learning algorithms to predict charging behavior, including
stay duration and energy consumption based on historical charging records. It is noted
that prediction error increases along with the rise of data entropy or the decrease of data
sparsity. Thus, this paper accounts for both indicators by defining the entropy/sparsity ratio
(R). When R is low, support vector regression (SVR) and random forest (RF) regression
show better accuracy for stay duration and energy consumption predictions, respectively.
While R is high, a diffusion-based kernel density estimator (DKDE) performs better for
both predictions. The three methods are assembled as the proposed Ensemble Predicting
Algorithm (EPA) to improve predicting performance by decreasing 11% of the duration and
22% of the energy consumption prediction errors.
2.5.1 Machine Learning Algorithms
Since the charging pattern varies from each other, there is no one-size-fits-all predictor for
all EV users. Therefore, EV users charging patterns were classified, and eight different pre-
diction algorithms were applied to those different classes for comparison to find the optimal
solution. Eight prediction algorithms are reviewed here in the following sub-sections. By
examining the EV charging data, the data can be roughly classified into four categories:
linear, non-linear, clustered, and scattered patterns. Multiple linear regression is suitable
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for a linear pattern. SVR can predict both linear and non-linear patterns and is not biased
by outliers. Decision tree (DT), random forest (RF) regression are appropriate for clustered
patterns. RF can be more accurate than DT since DT may easily lead to over-fitting. How-
ever, it is required to determine the proper number of trees for RF. KNN regression can
also be applied for a clustered pattern. Scattered pattern is challenging for prediction. In
this case, GKDE and DKDE are used to find the probability density function and make a
prediction by calculating the expected value. A statistical method is applied here for com-
parison. These algorithms are compared, and their effectivenesses are evaluated for different
EV charging patterns.
2.5.1.1 Statistical Method
Statistical method such as historical average are referred to as a naive approach, and it is a
simple algorithms that used only for comparison with the other forecasting techniques. For
the historical average algorithm, the prediction is the average of the past data.
2.5.1.2 Multiple Linear Regression(MLR)
MLR is used to describe the mathematical relationship between several explanatory variables
and a response variable, and the goal is to make predictions about the response variable
based on the known explanatory variables according to this relationship. For example, to
predict a stay duration based on the start time and day of week. The model of MLR with k
explanatory variables and n observations is as follows:
yi = b0 + b1xi1 + b2xi2...+ bkxik + ei for i = 1, 2, ...n, (2.25)
where yi is the response variable, b0 is the y-intercept term, [b1, b2, ..., bk] are the regression
coefficients, [xi1, xi2, ..., xik] are explanatory variables and ei is the error term, which is also
known as residual that is used to account for the difference between the actual outcome and
the prediction. In this paper, for stay duration prediction, xi1 is start time and xi2 is day of
week (k = 2). For energy consumption, xi1 is start time, xi2 is day of week, and xi3 is stay du-
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ration(k = 3). Here we use the Python package (sklearn.linear model.LinearRegression)
[BLB13] for the MLR model.
2.5.1.3 Support Vector Regression (SVR)
SVR is a type of support vector machine that supports linear and non-linear regression.
Unlike general linear regression methods, which try to minimize the error between the pre-
diction and data, SVR makes sure the errors do not exceed the threshold. Specifically, in
ε-SVR[Vap95], the goal is to find a function yˆ(x) that has at most ε deviation from the
obtained targets yi for the training data, ignoring the outliers that locate outside of the
ε-tolerence band. Consider a training dataset {(x1, y1), ..(xn, yn)} ⊂ X, where X denotes the
space of the input data, SVR can be expressed as follows:
yˆ(x) = 〈ω, x〉+ b with ω ⊂ X, b ⊂ R, (2.26)
where ω an b are the solutions of the following optimization problem:
min
w,b,ξ
1
2
‖ω‖2 + C
n∑
i=1
(ξi + ξ
∗
i )
subject to

yi − 〈ω, xi〉 − b ≤ ε+ ξi
〈ω, xi〉+ b− yi ≤ ε+ ξ∗i
ξi, ξ
∗
i ≥ 0.
(2.27)
In equation(2.27), slack variables ξi, ξ
∗
i are introduced to handle the problem of infeasible
ε-precision constraints. The constant C > 0 controls the trade-off between the flateness of
yˆ(x) (which is ‖ω‖2) and the number of training data points that deviate larger than ε is
tolerated. This optimization problem can be solved by Lagrange multipliers method and the
solution is given by
ω =
n∑
i=1
(αi − α∗i )Φ(xi) and f(x) =
n∑
i=1
(αi − α∗i )k(xi, x) + b, (2.28)
where αi, α
∗
i are Lagrange multipliers in which αi, α
∗
i ∈ [0, C], Φ (xi) is a transformation
function, and k (xi, x) , 〈Φ (xi) ,Φ (x)〉 is a kernel function. The kernel function transforms
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the data into a higher dimensional feature space to make it possible to perform the linear
regression. The Gaussion radial basis function (RBF ) is used here as a kernel function:
k (x, xi) = e
− ‖x−xi‖
2
2σ2 , (2.29)
where σ ∈ R is the kernel parameter. The detail of the SVR formulation can be found in
[SS03]. Here we use the Python package (sklearn.svm.svr) [BLB13] for the SVR model.
2.5.1.4 Decision Tree (DT) Regression
Decision tree (DT ) regression is a regression model in the form of a tree structure that breaks
down a dataset into smaller classified subsets using each of the independent variables’ split
points. The average of the classified subset is the prediction value for the target with respect
to its corresponding independent variable values. The classified subsets are called leaf nodes
whereas the split points are decision nodes. For each decision node, mean square error
(MSE) are compared across the independent variables and the variable/point rendering the
lowest MSE is chosen as the root node/decision node. The process is recursively continued
until the optimal split of the data is achieved, which is defined in terms of tree size constraints
within the Python package (sklearn.tree.DecisionTreeRegressor)[BLB13] used here.
2.5.1.5 Random Forest (RF) Regression
Random forest (RF) regression is an ensemble learning method that combines and averages
decisions from a sequence of DT models. Formally, RF regression can be expressed as follows:
g(x) =
1
Ntree
Ntree∑
i=1
fi(x), (2.30)
where g (x) is the RF model, fi (x) is the i
th DT model, and Ntree is the number of decision
trees. Each fi (x) is built from a sample drawn with replacement from the training dataset.
By using the average of the multiple DT models on the corresponding sub-samples of the
dataset, the predictive accuracy can be improved.
Here we use the Python package (sklearn.ensemble.RandomForestRegressor) [BLB13] for the
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RF model.
2.5.1.6 K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) Regression
K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) is a non-parametric method used for classification and regression
[Alt92]. The regression model is used since the data labels are continuous instead of discrete
variables. The model implements learning based on the k-nearest neighbors of each query
point, where k = 4 is specified in this paper. The prediction of a query point is the average
of its nearest neighbors, and it is assumed that each neighbor contributes uniformly to the
classification of the query point.
Here we use the Python package (sklearn.neighbors.KNeighborsRegressor) [BLB13] for the
KNN model.
Kernel density estimators including GKDE and DKDE are reviewed in Section
2.4.1 and 2.4.2, respectively.
2.5.2 Data Preparation
Two sources of EV charging data were applied to this research, including SMERC charging
stations on the UCLA campus[Sma] as working space and real residential EV users’ data
in the UK that is available from the EA technology website[Eat16]. The data used from
the UCLA charging stations was recorded from October 1, 2015 to December 31, 2017
and the data from the EV technology between February 16, 2014 and November 29, 2015.
However, not every user in those datasets has a charging history that is long enough for data
analysis and prediction. Therefore, we selected 50 users’ data from UCLA and 202 form EV
technology, which have at least 100 charging records, with 39,458 records in total. The data
was split into 70% for the training set, 20% for the validation set, and 10% for the test set.
The statistics for charging start time, stay duration, and energy consumption are shown
in the figures below. Fig. 2.8 shows two peaks for EV charging start time: one at 7:30 in the
morning and the other at 17:30 in the evening. The average stay duration is 3 hours, and the
average energy consumption is 10.63 kWh, as shown in Fig. 2.9 and Fig. 2.10, respectively.
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Figure 2.8: Statistics of EV charging start time
Figure 2.9: Statistics of EV stay duration
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Figure 2.10: Statistics of EV energy consumption per charge
2.5.2.1 Data Preprocessing
The charging start time and stay duration were converted to hour. For instance, 13:15 will be
noted as 13.25 hour. If a stay duration was smaller than 0.5 hour or an energy consumption
was smaller than 1 kWh, the entire 5-tuple parameter for that charging session was removed
from the dataset. Also, if an energy consumption was mistakenly recorded as more than the
physical maximum of the charging device, the record value was replaced by the maximum
value of its historical energy consumption.
2.5.2.2 Data Entropy
Joint entropy is used here to characterize the uncertainty of a set of variables. Two kinds
of datasets were analyzed, which are start time vs. duration data and duration vs. energy
consumption data. For calculation, start time and duration are rounded to the closest
half hour, and the energy consumption is rounded to the closest integer. The values of
start time and duration are then mapped into a set of integers ∈ [0, 47], which represents
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[0 : 00, 23 : 30].The formulation of a joint entropy is as follows:
E(X, Y ) = −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
P (x, y)log2[P (x, y)], (2.31)
where x and y are the two variables in dataset X and Y , respectively; P (x, y) is the joint
probability of the two variables.
2.5.2.3 Data Sparsity
Sparsity is defined as the number of zero entries devided by the total number of entries.
Intuitively, if a sparsity is high the data is less variant because most entries are repeated.
On the other hand, for low sparsity, the data is more scattered. As was the data entropy
discussed in the previous section, start time vs. duration data and duration vs. energy
consumptuon data are analyzed. The values of start time, duration, and energy consumption
are rounded. Following are the examples of sparsity calculation:
Figure 2.11: Sparsity of EV charging patterns. Left: start time vs. duration, Right:
duration vs. energy consumptuon
In Fig. 2.11, the numbers in the cells are the number counts for the data points. For start
time vs. duration, the start time ranges from 0 to 23 while the duration from 0 to 9. The
number of non-zero entries is 31 and the total entries is 240, thus the sparsity is (240-31)/240
= 0.87. In the same manner, the sparsity for duration vs. energy consumptuon is 0.89.
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2.5.3 Preliminary Result and Proposed Algorithm
2.5.3.1 Preliminary Results
Fig. 2.12 and Fig. 2.13 show the comparisons of eight algorithms’ prediction errors with re-
gard to data entropy, data sparsity and the ratio of entropy/sparsity (R). Generally, SMAPE
positively correlates to data entropy and negatively correlates to data sparsity. Therefore,
this paper takes into account both of the effects of entropy and sparsity by defining the ratio:
R = entropy/sparsity. SD and DE represent the datasets of Start time vs. Duration and
Duration vs. Energy Consumption, respectively. Dataset SD is used to predict stay duration
while DE is utilized to predict energy consumption. Ratios of R SD and R DE are calcu-
lated using the training datasets’ data entropy and sparsity. ρ is the correlation coefficient
of SMAPE and R. P-value indicates the statistical significance of the trend (significant if
P-value < 0.05).
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Figure 2.12: Comparisons of SMAPE(%) versus entropy, sparsity and R SD (en-
tropy/sparsity)
37
The SMAPEs of MLR, SVR, DT, RF, and KNN are compared with DKDE as shown in
Fig. 2.14 and Fig. 2.15. Fig. 2.14 compares the SMAPEs of duration, and it shows that when
R SD is larger than 5.5, DKDE performs better. Likewise, Fig. 2.15 compares the SMAPEs
of energy consumption predictions, and it shows that DKDE performs better when R DE is
larger than 4.
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Figure 2.13: Comparisons of SMAPE(%) versus entropy, sparsity and R DE (en-
tropy/sparsity)
Table 2.2 shows the duration prediction results of the different algorithms. It indicates
that SVR is most accurate overall, especially when R SD ≤ 5.5. DKDE is the best when
R SD > 5.5 and the SMAPE does not change significantly in different R SD categories.
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Figure 2.14: Comparisons of different algorithms with DKDE for duration prediction
C
om
pa
ris
on
Figure 2.15: Comparisons of different algorithms with DKDE for energy consumption pre-
diction
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Table 2.2: Average and Standard deviation (in parentheses) for the SMAPE(%) of duration
prediction
Ratio(R SD) SVR MLR DT RF DKDE GKDE KNN AVE
R SD≤ 5.5
(n=187)
9.54 (4.66) 10.19 (5.91) 11.84 (5.62) 10.21 (5.32) 10.96 (6.37) 17.39 (14.32) 12.65 (6.26) 18.43 (7.78)
R SD>5.5
(n=65)
13.40 (4.40) 13.51 (4.20) 16.66 (4.78) 14.15 (4.33) 11.81 (4.15) 14.90 (5.84) 16.82(4.95) 23.47 (7.61)
Overall
(n=252)
10.54 (4.89) 11.05 (5.69) 13.09 (5.80) 11.23 (5.36) 11.18 (5.88) 16.75 (12.72) 13.73(6.21) 19.73 (8.03)
Table 2.3: Average and Standard deviation (in parentheses) for the SMAPE(%) of energy
consumption prediction
Ratio (R DE) SVR MLR DT RF DKDE GKDE KNN AVE
R DE ≤ 4
(n=204)
9.06 (4.25) 8.71 (4.14) 9.16 (4.55) 7.96 (3.68) 8.31 (4.20) 10.33 (4.23) 11.80 (5.38) 16.10 (4.64)
R DE >4
(n=48)
12.91(4.11) 12.69 (4.32) 13.68 (5.52) 11.59 (4.04) 10.54 (3.76) 12.68 (4.80) 15.70 (5.54) 17.86 (3.21)
Overall
(n=252)
9.79 (4.48) 9.46 (4.45) 10.01 (5.05) 8.65 (4.00) 8.73 (4.21) 10.78 (4.43) 12.54 (5.61) 16.43 (4.45)
Table 2.3 shows the energy consumption prediction results of the different algorithms.
RF is shown to be the most accurate overall, especially when R DE ≤ 4. Similarly, DKDE
performs the best when R DE > 4.
2.5.3.2 Proposed Algorithm
Based on the preliminary results, the combination of SVR, RF, and DKDE is proposed to
form an ensemble algorithm, namely the EPA. The algorithm is depicted in Fig. 2.16 below.
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Figure 2.16: Flowchart of the ensemble predicting algorithm
Data entropy and sparsity are analyzed for all registered EV users in the system in order
to calculate the R value. When an EV is plugged in, the user’s R SD is retrieved to determine
either SVR or DKDE to be used for predicting stay duration. The predicted stay duration
is then sent to the next step for energy consumption prediction. Similarly, RF or DKDE is
applied depending on the value of R DE. The threshold of R to switch the algorithms may
need to update quarterly since user behaviors may change over time. The EPA is evaluated
using a 10% test dataset. The prediction results along with the EV scheduling results are
presented in the next section.
2.5.4 Results and Discussion
Fig. 2.17 and Fig. 2.18 show the SMAPE with regard to R for duration and energy con-
sumption predictions, respectively. Fig. 2.17 illustrates the comparison between SVR and
DKDE. As shown in the figure, the SMAPE of SVR is smaller when R SD is smaller than 5.5,
whereas the SMAPE of DKDE is smaller when R SD is larger than 5.5. Fig. 2.18 demon-
strates the comparison between RF and DKDE. As expected, RF is more accurate when
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R DE is smaller than 4, while DKDE performs better when R DE is larger than 4.
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Figure 2.17: Average SMAPE vs. R SD for SVR and DKDE
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Figure 2.18: Average SMAPE vs. R DE for RF and DKDE
Table 2.4 shows the average and standard deviation for the SMAPE of duration and
energy consumption predictions. A pairwise T-test with the null hypothesis that the EPA
has the same performance as the other algorithms is rejected by the small P-values (p <
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0.05). The results show that EPA has decreased the errors significantly for duration and
energy consumption predictions by around 11% and 22%, respectively.
Table 2.4: SMAPE(%), standard deviation (in parentheses), and the pairwise T-test result
Duration Prediction Energy Consumption Prediction
Algorithm SVR DKDE EPA RF DKDE EPA
SMAPE (%) 11.53 (5.18) 11.67 (6.36) 10.40 (5.80) 9.69 (4.60) 9.56 (4.26) 7.54 (4.24)
P-value 0.00964409 0.00833339 - 0.00182736 2.00649× 10−05 -
Root mean squared error (RMSE) is also evaluated to show the effectiveness of EPA.
Since each user has different number of charging records, here we calculate the mean of
RMSE of all users, called mean estimation deviation (MED) as defined in Equation 2.24.
Table 2.5 shows the comparison of MED among SVR, DKDE, RF, and EPA. For EPA, the
prediction MED for stay duration is 1.16 hour and for energy consumption is 2.52 kWh.
Table 2.5: MED (Duration: hour; Energy: kWh), standard deviation (in parentheses), and
the pairwise T-test result
Duration Prediction Energy Consumption Prediction
Algorithm SVR DKDE EPA RF DKDE EPA
MED 1.36 (0.69) 1.38 (0.47) 1.16 (0.54) 2.94 (1.35) 2.65 (0.87) 2.52 (0.97)
P-value 0.00449328 1.3247× 10−07 - 1.49621× 10−6 0.0017243 -
2.6 Conclusion
Section 2.4 shows the comparison of GKDE and DKDE. While GKDE and DKDE have
their strengths in predicting irregular and regular charging patterns, respectively, the nov-
elty detection method exploits the synergy between them. Specifically, the novelty detection
is utilized to determine charging pattern regularities, so that GKDE can be applied for
irregular-pattern EV users while DKDE for regular patterns. Thus the proposed HKDE
leads to more accurate predictions in comparison to using only either GKDE or DKDE.
However, HKDE results in slightly higher prediction accuracy than DKDE. Therefore, Sec-
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tion 2.5 examines more machine learning prediction approaches and investigates EV charging
behaviors aiming to find the best method for its prediction. It is found that, in general, pre-
dicting SMAPEs positively correlate to data sparsity/entropy ratio (R) but this relationship
for GKDE and DKDE is relatively weak. Therefore, the KDE method can be utilized to
handle the high R data with lower prediction error. Based on this property and the analysis
result, SVR, RF, and DKDE are selected to compose the EPA. The synergy of the three
algorithms enhances the prediction performance where SVR is good at predicting EV stay
duration, RF performs better on energy consumption estimation, and DKDE takes care of
the prediction with the high R data. The estimations by HKDE and EPA are applied to the
optimal EV charging scheduling algorithm for load variation and charging cost minimization
in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
EV Charging Scheduling Model
3.1 Overview
The surge of EV has been observed in the past few years, and the global EV market continues
to grow[MH14, SL19] because of the dwindling of the fossil fuel and the dedication to reducing
carbon footprint emission worldwide. As in California, it is expected to have 1.5 million
zero-emission EVs on the road by 2025 from the initiative from the government[Off12], and
consequently, the increasing demand of the Electrical Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE)
is foreseen. While the number of EV is increasing, without proper charging management,
the uncoordinated power consumption on a local scale can stress the electrical grid and
lead to grid problems that degrading power quality and reliability[CHD09, MWJ14, SIF15].
Therefore, more and more studies are focusing on EV charging coordination in order to
accommodate the increasing number of EVs.
It is still a challenging task to manage a massive number of EV charging. First of
all, there are several uncertainties on the demand side, such as start charging time, stay
duration, and energy demand, as discussed in Section 2. Secondly, an uncoordinated EV
charging may degrade the grid power quality or even damage the grid because it can produce
a huge power demand that exceeds the grid capacity [LSA10]. Thirdly, the integration of
renewable energy resources such as photovoltaic (PV) panel, requires proper control method
for optimal energy utilization and PV intermittency alleviation [Cal16]. Lastly, the dynamic
electricity price may significantly affect the EV charging cost. All of the above should be
taken into consideration for an effective, real-time EV charging scheduling system.
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3.2 Literature Review
A considerable number of studies have been made on EV charging management not only in
the aspect of an economical implementation of EVSE but also in the reliability of a distri-
bution grid, which is to alleviate the deteriorating impact of uncoordinated EV charging.
[DTB12] and [LWL12] discuss the optimal sizing and location of EVSE while [LGZ18] further
demonstrates the need of multi-types of charging facilities for optimal EVSE deployment.
[TMN17] presents a charging scheduling algorithm to accommodate a high penetration of
EVs and DERs. Also, [HC16] discusses EV charging scheduling with the consideration of
vehicle-to-grid (V2G) capability. Studies of EV load scheduling fall into two approaches:
centralized and distributed methods. Centralized means a central entity (CE) directly con-
trols the EV; namely, a CE solves the optimization problem and broadcasts the results to the
EVs [CHD09, BNE16]. The objectives of the optimization includes minimizing power loss
[CHD09, SHM10], regulating load factor [SHM10] or maximizing supportable EV penetra-
tion [LSA10]. The centralized infrastructure requires to collect the information form all EVs
and centrally optimize their charging schedules. Therefore, EV owners’ privacy becomes an
issue. Also, when EV penetration increases, the data is more difficult to manage, and the
curse of dimensionality becomes a problem. On the other hand, a distributed approach is
more suitable for managing a large scale of EV charging. In this method, CE coordinates
the EV load demand through communication with the EV chargers [LBM16]. That is, in-
stead of solving the scheduling problem, including many variables centrally, it is solved in a
distributed and iterative manner between CE and EV charging agents. Over the past few
years, a large number of articles have been devoted to the study of distributed EV charg-
ing scheduling approach. What seems to be lacking, however, is to consider user behavior
stochasticity. Load flattening is achieved in [CF10], but the EV stay duration, energy de-
mand are assumed to be known. [GTL13, MCH11] have optimally scheduled EV charging
to achieve load valley filling, but user behavior uncertainties are not considered. [MCH11]
assumed every EV has the same charging window and the same charging demand, which is
not realistic.
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In the following section, an EV charging scheduling algorithm incorporated with the EV
user behavior prediction method introduced in chapter2 is presented, with the objectives of
minimizing load variance and reducing charging cost.
3.3 Model Description
We consider an EVCI that is controlled and managed by a control entity (CE). The purpose
of CE is twofold: minimizing the peak load, which is equivalent to load variance minimization
[SHM10], as well as reducing total charging cost. We assume that EVCI (Fig. 3.1) has a 45
kWh BES and 35 kW PV panels, and it is supplied by an electrical feeder shared with an
office building which its average net load demand is 250 kW.
Distribution Grid
Building
PV Panels BES
EVCs
Figure 3.1: EVCI configuration.
The total number of EVs and EV chargers (EVCs) are denoted byN andM, respectively,
where N ,M∈ N. In this configuration, each EVC has four charging outlets and can charge
four EVs at the same time, so we use Nl to show the set of EVs supplied by EV Cl. The
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model of EVCI and the building can be written as:
zj(t+ 1) = zj(t) + Thuj(t), j = 1, ...,N , BES (3.1a)
eCIB(t) = dB(t)− pPV (t) +
N ,BES∑
j=1
uj(t) (3.1b)
where zj(t) ∈ Xj ∈ R, uj(t), eCIB(t), dB(t), pPV (t) ∈ R and t ∈ N. zj(t) in [kWh] is the
energy stored in EVj or BES, eCIB(t) in [kW] is the total net load demand of the EVCI
and the building, and pPV (t) in [kW] is the power generated by PV. It is assumed that
EVs and EVCs have Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) capability, so they can supply power to the
grid. dB(t) in [kW] is the load demand of the building. In (3.1a), Th (in hours [h]) is the
discretization in time, e.g. Th = 0.5 corresponds to 30 min. uj(t), which is the EV/BES
charging (discharging) power, is introduced as the optimization variable. uj(t) is positive in
the charging mode, and it is negative in discharging mode.
The constraints on the energy capacity of EVs and BES are:
Cj(t) 6 zj(t) 6 Cj(t), j = 1, ...,N , BES (3.2)
where Cj(t) and Cj(t) are the bounds on the energy stored in EVs and BES. The constraints
on charging/discharging power of EVs and their corresponding EVCs as well as BES are:
uj 6 uj(t) 6 uj, j = 1, ...,N , BES (3.3a)
g
l
(t) 6
Nl∑
i=1
uli(t) 6 gl(t), l = 1, ...,M (3.3b)
where uj and uj are the minimum and maximum power ratings of the EV and BES chargers,
and g
l
and gl are the minimum and maximum power ratings of the EVCs.
The bounds in (3.2) for EVs are time-varying and defined as follows; if EVj, j = 1, ...,N
is:
• not plugged in EVC, Cj(t) = Cj(t) = 0
• plugged in EVC, but it is in idle mode, Cj(t) = 0 & Cj(t) = Cj
• plugged in EVC, and it is needed by time t, Cj(t) = Cj(t) = Cj
where Cj is the maximum capacity of EVj’s battery.
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3.4 Problem Formulation
For the given time index t and prediction horizon N ∈ N, let’s denote the vector notation
uj =
(
uj(t), uj(t + 1), . . . , uj(t + N − 1)
)T
,uj(t) ∈ RN , which is used for all other variables
as well. To formulate the objective function, we define total net load demand at time t by
(3.4):
Ω := dB − pPV (3.4)
Also, the average net load demand at time t over time horizon N ∈ N is:
Ω :=
1
N
k+N−1∑
t=k
Ω (3.5)
Accordingly, the twofold objective function of EV charging coordination (CC) is written
as:
V := min
u
{
N ,BES∑
j=1
α
(
ΠTuj
)
+
k+N−1∑
t=k
(
Ω− (Ω +
N ,BES∑
j=1
uj)
)2
}
s.t. (3.1)− (3.3)
(3.6)
where α is a weighting factor, and Π ∈ RN is time of use (TOU) price vector [Cal]. The first
part in (3.6) reduces charging cost, while the second part minimizes the total load variance.
3.5 EV Scheduling Results and Discussion
3.5.1 EV Scheduling using HKDE prediction
Using HKDE prediction results, we run CC for the EVCI including 107 EVs and 27 EVCs.
Dynamic electricity price used in our numerical simulation is shown in Fig. 3.2. Total
charging profiles of the EVCI for uncoordinated CC (uCC) and CC using real and HKDE
data are shown in Fig. 3.3. As it is clear, CC flattens the total load profile which results in
peak load shaving and valley filling. Also, the difference between load profile using HKDE
and real data is negligible during most of the time intervals. Comparing BES profile (Fig. 3.4)
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and aggregated EV load profile (Fig. 3.5) with dynamic price (Fig. 3.2), when energy price
is high (7:00 and 20:00), BES is discharged in order to supply EV load, and it is charged
while the energy price is low.
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Figure 3.2: Dynamic price for the EV charging scheduling simulation [Cal].
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Figure 3.3: Load profile using uCC and CC based on real data and GKDE, DKDE and
HKDE estimations.
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Figure 3.4: BES power and energy. Positive power: BES charging; Negative power: BES
discharging.
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Figure 3.5: The comparison of aggregated EV load using real data and GKDE, DKDE and
HKDE estimations.
Table 3.1: Comparison of RMS errors of aggregated EV loads.
RMS Error (%)
GKDE 20.24
DKDE 20.15
HKDE 17.72
The comparison of RMS errors among the aggregated loads of GKDE, DKDE and HKDE
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is shown in Table 3.1. Together with the aggregated EV load profiles illustrated in Fig. 3.5,
HKDE demonstrates a better prediction accuracy over GKDE and DKDE.
Depending on the α values in (3.6), total charging cost, peak-to-peak (PTP) and root-
mean-square (RMS) of the total load profile vary. By increasing α, PTP and RMS increase
and total charging cost decrease and vice versa. For comparison, numerical simulation results
for different α values are shown in Table 3.2. As it is seen, by increasing α from 10 to 100
using real data (CC-Real), the total charging cost decreases from $111.70 to $107.68 at the
expense of PTP and RMS degradation. As it is shown in the table, the PTP with α = 100 is
even worse than that with uCC. Therefore it is important to consider PTP and RMS while
minimizing the charging cost.
Table 3.2: Comparison between uCC with CC using real data and HKDE
Charging Type α Value PTP (kW) RMS (kW) $Charging Cost
uCC – 212.11 91.07 120.66
CC-Real
10 140.26 76.74 111.70
50 166.44 80.61 109.73
100 255.46 89.68 107.68
CC-HKDE
10 138.08 77.36 111.93
50 156.16 80.49 110.32
100 251.54 89.13 108.43
3.5.2 EV scheduling using EPA
Using EPA prediction results, we run CC for the EVCI including 252 EVs and 63 EVCs.
Dynamic electricity price used in our numerical simulation is shown in Fig. 3.6. Total
charging profiles of the EVCI for uncoordinated charging (uCC) and CC using real and
prediction data are shown in Fig. 3.7. As it is clear, CC flattens the total load profile which
results in peak load shaving when dynamic price is high and valley filling when the price is
low. Also, the difference between load profile using EPA and real data is negligible during
most of the time intervals. However, there appears a valley during 23:00 and 4:00 in Fig. 3.7
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and is not filled. This is because of less availability of EVs according to our dataset, in
which the ”end time” refers to the ”end charging time” instead of ”un-plugging time,” and
therefore further restrains the EVs’ time flexibility for charging.
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Figure 3.6: Dynamic price for the EV charging scheduling simulation [Cal]
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Figure 3.7: Load profile using uCC and CC algorithms based on real data
The coordinated and uncoordinated EV charging scheduling results with respect to peak-
to-peak (PTP) and root-mean-square (RMS) of the load profile, and charging cost are shown
in Table 3.3. The result of CC EPA aligns well with CC Real, and reduces 27% peak load,
10% load variation, and 4% charging cost from that of uCC’s.
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Table 3.3: Comparison between uCC with CC using real data and EPA
Algorithm PTP (kW) RMS (kW) Total Cost ($)
CC Real 307.13 139.59 219.94
CC EPA 300.50 139.24 219.25
uCC 411.83 156.44 229.13
Although the result shows only $10 can be saved per day by scheduling 252 EVs’ charging
comparing to uncoordinated charging, with a large number of EVs, the saving can be signif-
icant. Furthermore, according to [Key16], the energy unit cost (EUC) negatively related to
a load factor (LF) along with a hyperbolic function (EUC ∝ 1/LF ), where LF is defined
as follows:
LF =
AveragePower
PeakPower
∗ 100%. (3.7)
The price will approach the minimum when LF close to 1. As shown in Fig. 2.8, people tend
to plug in EVs in the morning when they arrive at work, and in the evening when they get
home. If the energy peak produced by EV charging that drastically lower the LF, the energy
price will increase sharply. Therefore, EV charging control is necessary to accommodate
such larger amount of EVs within the electrical grid.
The results show that the EPA model fits the true densities, including start time, stay
duration, and energy consumption, better than the other algorithms. Therefore, the control
entity (CE) can schedule EV charging optimally in terms of minimizing peak loads and
reducing charging cost. For scale-up, a considerable amount of EVs can be utilized to
mitigate the renewable energy intermittency issue such as solar duck-curve problem. Since
the EPA algorithm can predict the EVs’ availability very well, in combination with vehicle-
to-grid (V2G) technology, the charging CE can manage to charge EVs during the midday
when solar power is ample and discharge during the evening to reduce the peak load.
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3.6 Conclusion
As can be seen in the prediction result in Section 2.4.4, there is a slight improvement of HKDE
over DKDE. This is because of DKDE’s over-fitting issue for the irregular charging patterns,
instead of an accurate prediction generated by GKDE. In other words, the prediction error
for GKDE is still significant, but it is even larger for DKDE in the case of over-fitting. This
can be due to a short charging history of a user or the user’s irregular charging behavior
in nature. However, this case is rare for most EV users. DKDE can provide more accurate
predictions in general, thanks to its capability to model the charging record distribution
accurately. The comparison between GKDE and DKDE is made in Fig. 3.8, and it shows
that DKDE aligns with the empirical data better than GKDE. Therefore, DKDE is used in
the EPA.
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Figure 3.8: The comparison of modeling EV users’ charging behavior between GKDE and
DKDE. (textbfTop: stay duration; textbfBottom: energy consumption)
It is founded that, in general, predicting SMAPEs positively correlate to data spar-
sity/entropy ratio (R), but this relationship for GKDE and DKDE is relatively weak. There-
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fore, the KDE method can be utilized to handle the high R data with lower prediction error.
Based on this property and the analysis result, SVR, RF, and DKDE are selected to compose
the EPA. The synergy of the three algorithms enhances the prediction performance where
SVR is good at predicting EV stay duration, RF performs better on energy consumption
estimation, and DKDE takes care of the prediction with the high R data. The estimations
by EPA are then applied to the optimal EV charging scheduling algorithm for load variation
and charging cost minimization. Owing to the increased accuracy of the prediction, the
scheduling algorithm can provide better EV charging load management in terms of reduc-
ing load variation and charging cost. Real data is employed for a numerical simulation to
demonstrate the improved prediction accuracy of EPA and validate the effectiveness of the
EV charging scheduling algorithm.
The proposed EPA algorithm can be applied to any scale of charging station, with an
assumption that EVs’ charging records are known. However, to reach optimal scheduling
within a distribution grid, the connection between each charging station is required.
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CHAPTER 4
Vulnerability and Risk for EV Charging System
4.1 Overview
The electricity distribution system has become more complex and dynamic because of the
increasing deployment of renewable energy resources such as wind and solar energy, and
the surge of EVs within electrical grids. These changes have brought about significant
challenges for the distribution system operator (DSO) who manages the grid. Therefore,
new technologies such as smart controllers, smart meters, or demand response incorporating
the Internet of Things (IoT) technology have been developed to cope with the challenges of
managing this complex grid, rendering the digitalization of the power grid, namely, the smart
grid. Improved sensing, communication, and control capability enhance the performance of
smart grid operation, but at the expense of increased vulnerabilities to deliberate attacks
and accidental failures, threatening the grids functionality and reliability.
Although an increasing number of studies have been made on cybersecurity for the power
system, there is a lack of a consistent cyberattack assessment in EV networks. Each of the
new layers of data integration and control that are added to electric distribution systems can
create new attack surfaces and potential privacy breaches. The rapid pace of electrification
in the transportation sector, realized through plug-in EV (PEV) integration, necessitates
the smart charging infrastructures. These systems built on real-time data collection and
decision making coordinate the charging demand to facilitate high penetration of PEVs in
the power grids. Accordingly, the inherent cyber-physical characteristic of smart charging
networks makes them susceptible to cyber-physical threats.
This chapter presents the vulnerability analysis and risk assessment for the smart charging
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infrastructures. To this end, several potential failure scenarios for the WinSmartEVTM
charging system on the UCLA campus were defined, and the impacts of potential cyber-
physical attacks have been studied. Moreover, a codified methodology and taxonomy were
provided for assessing vulnerability and risk of cyber-physical attacks on the EV charging
networks in order to create a generalizable and comprehensive solution. The outcome is a
framework to prioritize the degree of the vulnerabilities and risks in the EV networks and
to develop effective countermeasures.
4.2 Literature Review
Automotive manufacturers are expanding their electric vehicle (EV) offerings, and the charg-
ing infrastructure is rapidly following. As of November of 2017, there were about fifty thou-
sand level 2 and DC fast-charging stations throughout the United states[WRM17], and as
of May 2019, the number rose to more than sixty-eight thousand [Gre19]. As EV charging
becomes a significant power consumer within a distribution grid, smart charging control
is essential for charging regulation. However, while charging stations become smart, they
become more susceptible to cyber-physical attacks. Nonetheless, there is a lack of studies
in potential cybersecurity problems for EV charging systems. Only a few attempts have
so far been made at different aspects of cybersecurity issues for EV.[CB12] discussed the
potential security vulnerability for EV infrastructure and the security issue for the com-
munication between EV and EVSE. [AAJ15] examined the cybersecurity issues for EV and
smart grid integration, and reviewed the state-of-the-art methods for cyber-attack detection.
[FAT18] justified the research need for Internet of EV (IoEV) security as it is a complex sys-
tem that involves vehicles, humans, sensors, road infrastructure and charging stations that
are vulnerable to cyber-physical security threats. What seems to be lacking, however, is a
comprehensive vulnerability analysis and risk assessment for an EV charging network.
Currently, a method for assessing the risk and impact of successful attacks against plug-
in EV (PEV) charging networks does not exist. As a result, this chapter aims to present
a method by working through several case studies regarding potential mock cyber-physical
58
attacks against the UCLA WinSmartEVTM charging platform. A survey has been conducted
to understand the attack feasibility and investigate the potential impact and risk of an
individual carrying out such an attack. Also, it helps to create the method outline for
assessing the risk and impact. In the next sections, we outline the UCLA charging network
structure, conduct vulnerability analysis of current systems, and provide a series of case
study topics of cyber-physical attacks and the several corresponding electric transportation
(ET) impact failure scenarios.
4.3 Vulnerability Analysis and Risk Assessment
4.3.1 EV Charging Network
There are two types of charging networks with varying levels of complexity: conventional
and smart grid. Conventional charging networks are connected to the primary power grid
infrastructure. However, the existing power grid suffers from a tight coupling that exposes it
to single points of failure for power distribution. Smart grids, localized power grids consisting
of smart devices that can connect to a larger power grid or generate, store, and distribute
electricity from within, alleviate some of the single points of failures in the network as shown
in Fig.4.1, UCLA WinSmartEVTM.
The UCLA WinSmartEVTM Network is a smart grid EV charging network. It generates
power from rooftop photovoltaic solar panels, stores the energy locally, and can send energy
to EV charging terminals for users to charge their EVs. The smart charging network monitors
the charging, schedules optimized aggregated charging sequences, and executes the schedule
via the control network. Critical data, including energy consumption and various power-
quality related variables, are recorded and uploaded to a centralized database managed by the
control center. The EV users can access the charging status via the UCLA WinSmartEVTM
mobile application.
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Figure 4.1: UCLA EV WinSmartTM
4.3.2 Potential Attacks and System Vulnerability
 8
Attack Surface of UCLA WINSmartEVTM Network 
9. Servers
1.Mobile Devices
2.Desktop systems
3.WiFi Network 5. ZigBee Network
6. 3G/4G Network
4. Gateways / 
routers
7. Charging Infrastructure
8. Database
Attack vector
Attack surface
WINSmartEVTM  NetworkWinSmart TM Network
Figure 4.2: Attack vectors and the attack surface of UCLA EV WinSmartEVTM network
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We define vulnerability as a weakness in an information system, system security procedures,
internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source
[Nat10]. Since 2013, an estimated 14 billion data record records have been lost or stolen
[Bre]. In the PEV network, cyber and physical vulnerabilities lie in the components shown in
Fig.4.2. Hackers have the advantage of choosing the time of the attack and the vulnerability
to exploit. In terms of cyber-physical compromise, both attacks and the impacts can be
cyber or physical domain. Table 4.1 shows the causality of some common cyber-physical
attacks [MKB12].
Table 4.1: The impact of cyber-physical device compromise[MKB12]
Attack \Impact Cyber Physical
Cyber
OpenSSL heartbleed bug
- Eavesdropping of private information
Stuxnet,
WannaCry virus
Physical Meter bypassing
Instability due to
physical destruction
As shown in the Table.4.1, the impacts of the cyber-physical attacks can be categorized
into four classes: Cyber-attack-Cyber-impact (CC); Cyber-attack-Physical-impact (CP);
Physical-attack-Cyber-impact (PC); and Physical-attack-Physical-impact (PP). Understand
the nature of the attacks would be helpful to come up with the solution for remedy and the
corresponding protecting action.
This section will explore several typical attack vectors on the UCLA WinSmartEVTM
network components. It should be noted that while we cover five typical types of attacks,
we considered a multitude of others, and not all will be listed, nor could all be sufficiently
covered.
Following are the potential attacks:
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4.3.2.1 Man-in-the-Middle Attack
The major risk of an attack comes from the router. The man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack
refers to the attacker secretly replaying and possibly altering the communication between two
parties by placing himself in the middle of communication [Rah17, CCO18]. As in Fig.4.3,
an attacker can intercept communication between the EV charging control center and drop,
modify, or add data transmissions. This can lead to simultaneous fast charges that can cause
a transformer overload.
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Potential Cyber-Attack Capabilities - Man in the Middle Attack
¤ A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is an attack where the attacker secretly 
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Figure 4.3: Man-in-the-Middle Attack
4.3.2.2 Denial-of-Service Attack
A d nial-of-service (DoS) attack occu s wh an attacker takes ac ion i ten i g to overload
and flood the network, so that a network service is unavailable to its intended users [CCO18,
QLS18]. In this scenario, the hacker can attack via the server and block an EV user from the
charging station, as shown in Fig.4.4. For example, unavailable communication blocks the
customer’s use of EV preferential rates. This can lead to a delay for high priority vehicles
such as ambulance and firetruck. There is an advanced DoS called distributed DOS(DDoS),
which can lead to a more severe outcome. While The DoS attack typically uses one computer
and one Internet connection to flood a targeted system or resource. The DDoS attack uses
multiple computers and Internet connections to flood the targeted resource. DDoS attacks
are often global attacks, distributed via botnets.
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 10
Potential Cyber-Attack Capabilities - Denial of Service Attack
¤ A denial of service (DoS) attack occurs when an attacker takes action 
intending to overload and flood the network, so that a network service is 
unavailable to its intended users[9][10]. There is an advanced DoS which 
called distributed DoS (DDoS).*
¤ Scenarios:
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F gure 4.4: Denial-of-Service Attack
4.3.2.3 Packet Replay Attack and Eavesdropping
As illustrated in Fig. 4.5, packet replay attack or eavesdropping occurs when an attacker
intercepts a request from an EV user. The action captures and repeats or delays valid data
transmissions, resulting in modified messages or spoofed on demand response automation
system(DARS) communication channels, or collect private EV user information [CCO18,
CMA17, BGS17]. This can lead to EV registration ID theft to falsifying credentials to
access the preferential rate of high priority EV users.
 11
¤ A packet replay attack occurs when an attacker maliciously captures and 
repeats, or delays, valid data transmissions[5][9].
Potential Cyber-Attack Capabilities - Packet Replay Attack
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Figure 4.5: Packet Replay Attack and Eavesdropping
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4.3.2.4 Address Resolution Protocol Spoofing
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing attack occurs when an attacker sends a falsified
ARP message over a local area network, resulting in the linking of an attackers MAC address
with the IP address of a legitimate computer or server on the network. Therefore, the
attacker will be able to receive any data that is intended for that IP address[BGS17]. The
ARP spoofing is illustrated in Fig.4.6.
 13
¤ Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing attack occurs when an 
attacker sends falsified ARP message over a local area network, resulting 
in the linking of an attacker’s MAC address with the IP ad ress of a  
legitimate computer or server on the network. Therefore, the attacker will 
be able to receive any data that is intended for that IP address[10].
Potential Cyber-Attack Capabilities – ARP Spoofing
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Reference: [10] Bijral, R., Gupta, A., & Sharma, L. S. (2017). Study of Vulnerabilities of ARP Spoofing and its detection using SNORT. International Journal of Advanced 
Research in Computer Science, 8(5).
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Figure 4.6: ARP Spoofing
4.3.2.5 Insider Attack
While an attacker tries to break into a network, an insider is much dangerous and unpre-
ventable. Even the most secure firewall does not stop an insider, as shown in Fig.4.7. An
insider can be employees, contractors, or an insider from outside [CMA17].
 14
¤ While an attacker trie  to break into a n tw rk, an insider is just in as much 
danger on the inside of the firewall as from the outside. An insider can be 
employees, contractors or an insider from outside[5].
Potential Cyber-Attack Capabilities – Insider Attack
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n DR6 - Custom Malware Compromises DRAS 
1000101011
1000000  10
1110010101
0101010100
1100111  01
0001010001
0011100001
1010010001
  01110101
Server
Insider
Attacker
Reference:
5. Cintuglu, M. H., Mohammed, O. A., Akkaya, K., & Uluagac, A. S. (2017). A Survey on Smart Grid Cyber-Physical System Testbeds. IEEE Communications Surveys 
and Tutorials, 19(1), 446-464.
Attack Vectors:
2,4,7,8,9
Figure 4.7: Insider Attack
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Table 4.2: Electric Transportation (ET) Failure Scenarios (I: Impact C: Cost R: Ratio)
Scenarios Description I C R Ranking Class
ET1 Custom Malware causes EV Overcharge and Explosion 3 3 1 Low CP
ET2 Simultaneous Fast Charges cause Transformer Overload 9 9 1 Low CP
ET3 Virus Propagated between EVs and EV Service Equipment (EVSE) 9 3 3 Medium CP
ET4 EV Charging Locations Disclosed via Utility Database 1 1 1 Low CC
ET5 Compromised Protocol Translation Module Enables Control of EVs 3 3 1 Low CP
ET6 EVSE Connects Wirelessly to Wrong Meter and Compromises Billing 3 3 1 Low CC
ET7 Private Information Disclosed in Transit between EV and EVSE 3 3 1 Low CC
ET8 Customer Misuses their EV Registration ID to Obtain Preferential Rate 0 0.1 0 Negligible CC
ET9 EV Registration ID Stolen to Obtain Preferential Rate 0 0.1 0 Negligible CC
ET10 High Priority EV Registration Identity Misused to Obtain Faster Charging 0 1 0 Negligible CC
ET11 All EV Registration IDs Stolen from Utility 3 1 3 Medium CC
ET12 Unavailable Communication Blocks Customer Use of EV Preferential Rate 1 3 0.33 Low CC
ET13 Invalidated EV Registration ID Blocks Customer use of Preferential Rate 1 3 0.33 Low CC
ET14 EV Charging Process Slowed by Validation Delay of EV Registration ID 1 3 0.33 Low CC
ET15 Malware Causes Discharge of EV to the Grid 3 0.1 30 High CP
ET16 An EV is Exploited to Threaten Transformer or Substation 9 9 1 Low CP
ET17 EVSE Meter Bypassing Result in Wrong Billing 3 1 3 Medium PC
ET18 EVSE Destruction Result in Unavailability of Charging Service 1 1 1 Low PP
4.3.3 Risk Assessment
When investigating the cyber-physical attacks on EV networks, we found that there exist
two broad categories: (1) impact (2) cost. The impact is the impact and effects on the
likelihood and opportunity of a successful attack. The cost refers to the cost or resources
necessary for the attacker to be successful [Lee14]. To capture the relationship of impact
and cost, we defined the risk as the ratio of impact to cost.
Risk =
Impact
Cost
. (4.1)
The impact can be quantified as a 0, 1, 3, or 9 that represents the severity of a specific
failure scenario, in which 0 is least significant and 9 most significant. Similarly, the cost can
take on the values 0.1, 1, 3, or 9. Higher values of risk indicate risker systems. The potential
parameters for each variable were chosen to make calculating risk easier and understandable.
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The distance between the values also makes it easier for users to understand the different
levels of risk, impact, and cost. These values are obtained by surveying individuals knowl-
edgeable on cyber-physical system attacks. This formula highlights the areas of highest risk
and provides a ranking system that prioritizes remediation effort.
A NESCOR member company has successfully used this approach in the past [Lee14].
Using NESCOR as a reference, we quantified the impact of a failure scenario as an impact
score, which can take on the value 0, 1, 3, or 9. The values represent increasing severity of
impact. For example, impact scores could be:
• 0: one customer out of power for 15 minutes, petty cash expenses,
• 1: small generation plant offline,
• 3: 20% of customers experience defect from smart meter deployment,
• 9: large transformer destroyed and major city out of power for a week.
Additionally, we created a cost score that represents the cost and difficulty to the threat
agent to carry out the failure scenario, which can take on values 0.1, 1, 3, or 9. For example,
cost scores could be:
• 0.1: It is easy to trigger the failure scenario, almost no cost,
• 1: a bit of expertise and planning needed, such as capture keys off unencrypted smart
meter bus
• 3: serious expertise and planning needed to carry out scenario,
• 9: probably needs nation-state resources to carry out scenario (e.g., Stuxnet).
These scores are collected via a survey given to researchers familiar with the resources
required to carry out such cyber-physical attacks. In both cases, the scores increase in
severity as the number assigned increases. In cases, where scores are not the same values,
we proposed using equation(4.1) to calculate risk, since the likelihood of the impact of a
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cyber-physical attack and the means of carrying one our are directly proportional. In other
words, as the potential impact of a cyber-physical attack increases, the amount of resources
necessary to carry one out also increases. Thus, a higher ratio means a higher level of
urgency. The risk assessment for 18 scenarios for the EV charging system is summarized
in Table 4.2. The following subsections present three case studies for low- medium-, and
high-risk scenarios.
4.3.3.1 Case Study I: Low Risk
A possible vulnerability could exist in a protocol translation module where unauthorized
changes can be made. A successful attempt to exploit this may enable unauthorized control
of EVs such as ET 5 shown in Table 4.2. The resources to accomplish this would require
expertise and planning so that the cost score would be a three. The impact scenario could
be altering charging levels for a large number of vehicles within a short period, which can
have varied impacts ranging from inconveniencing customers. The impact value is also
three because it primarily targets inconvenience to consumers, but it can have an impact on
multiple consumers at the same time. Since the impact and cost are both three, the risk
ration is one that is not high, but it is essential to know to figure out if an attacker would
target this vulnerability.
4.3.3.2 Case Study II: Medium Risk
A possible vulnerability is the installation of malware in an EV. An attacker can propagate
a virus between EVs and EV Service Equipment (EVSE) such as ET 3 shown in Table 4.2.
Malware could affect driving mechanisms that could result in severe injury or loss of life.
The impact would be severe as it affects multiple EV drivers, so the impact score is 9. The
resources and cost to the attacker would require installing a virus, so the cost score is 3. This
scenario has a risk ratio of three and can be used to prioritize this issue above the previous.
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4.3.3.3 Case Study III: High Risk
A possible scenario is a malware causing the discharge of the electric vehicle to the microgrid,
such as ET 15 shown in Table 4.2. Relevant vulnerabilities in the system will be changes to
code in the charging station management system and protocol translation module or design,
implementation, or maintenance permits system to enter a hazardous state by overloading of
the distribution transformer if many EVs are discharged. The impact of such an attack could
be Critical damage to electric vehicles and associated costs, violation of customer contracts
and loss of customer confidence, or even sudden discharges that damage a transformer. In
this scenario, the impact could be assigned a 3, and the cost could be considered a 0.1, which
results in a risk score of 30.
4.3.4 Cybersecurity Survey of EV Users
A cybersecurity risk assessment is conducted via a survey on EV users’ concerns on the EV
charging system security. The purpose of this survey is to observe how consumers rank the
importance of the effects of cyber-physical attacks on EV charging networks. The consumer is
defined as any stakeholder whose product uses or is concerned with EV charging networks,
such as EV car manufacturers or electric utility providers, and any individual who is an
electric vehicle operator and who uses commercial PEV charging networks.
56 EV users have participated in the survey, and 50 of them had driven EV for at least
six months (Fig. 4.8). 52 users have the experience of using commercial plug-in charging
stations, which is defined as any charging station that does not use a charger plugging into a
wall outlet. The frequency of using commercial plug-in charging stations is shown in Fig. 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: The frequency of using commercial plug in charging stations
There are two parts of the survey, the perception of inconvenience scenarios that EV
users may experience when using commercial charging station and the concerning level for
the private information compromise, respectively. Table 4.3 shows the rank of the concerning
level of inconvenience.
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Table 4.3: Rank of the concerning level of inconvenience
Scenarios Rank
Charging station failure to charge electric vehicle 1
Car charges at slower than normal rate 2
Price fluctuation during car charging 3
Small inaccuracies in billing ranging $1-2 4
Table 4.4 shows the rank of the concerning level of private information compromise.
Table 4.4: Rank of the concerning level of private information compromise
Private information being compromised Rank
Credit or Debit card information 1
Account login information 2
Home address 3
Phone number 4
Transaction history at charging station 5
Popular routes,taken by your car 6
Frequently visited destinations 7
Name 8
4.4 Discussion
Table 4.2 shows the impact scenarios that can occur as a result of different attack types on
EV networks. Table 4.5 maps each scenario to the potential attacks.
The goal of the scoring mechanism is to rank risk in order to highlight areas of highest
risk and prioritize remediation effort. The mapping attacks is to identify the nature of the
attacks, thereby helps to find the corresponding solution. It is noted that a high ranking
does not necessarily have the highest impact. For ET15, malware may be injected by an
angry worker form EV maintenance service or anyone who has access to the EV. An EV
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Table 4.5: Mapping of potential ET impact scenarios of listed attack types.
Attack Type ET Failure Scenarios
Man in the Middle ET2, ET5, ET6, ET15, ET16
Denial of Service ET12, ET14
Packet Replay ET14
Eavesdropping ET4, ET7, ET9, ET10
ARP Spoofing ET4, ET7, ET9, ET10, ET13
Insider ET1, ET2, ET3, ET6, ET15, ET16
without malware detection can affect the EVSE when plugging in. On the other hand,
low ranking can also result in high impacts as ET2, ET3, and ET16. For those cases, the
attackers require a higher level of computer skill to compromise the system and thus increase
the cost of the attacks. The nature of the attack-impact causality is marked in the ”Class”
column. Generally, preventing cyber attacks relies on a stronger authentication process,
and avoiding cascading of physical impacts requires physical protection mechanisms such
as circuit breakers. Fault detection is essential for both cyber and physical consequences.
Physical attack, which is relatively rare, can be avoided by physically secure the access to
the infrastructures. The strategy of mitigation for each scenario is summarized in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Mitigation action for each ET scenario
Scenarios Mitigation Act
ET1
Overcharge-prevention hardware for EV battery[LSK15];
A stronger authentication mechanism for modifying EV
firmware [ZL12].
Continued on next page
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Table 4.6 – Continued from previous page
Scenarios Mitigation Act
ET2
A stronger authentication mechanism for configuring fast
charging management system[ZL12];
Fault-detection scheme for an unusual fast charging load[HST18];
Set an upper limit of EVs that can charge simultaneously;
Deploy a circuit breaker to protect distribution transformer.
ET3
Anti-virus program in charging system to detect
unauthorized software;
Fault-detection scheme to detect abnormal events or
functionality[HST18].
ET4
Enforcement of user password rule;
Improve data encryption method[ALF14];
A stronger authentication process to access the database[ZL12].
ET5 Strengthen the integrity protections for translation modules;
ET6
A stronger authentication check between EVSE and the
smart meter[MXD13];
A stronger authentication process to pair smart meter and
EVSE configuration[MXD13].
ET7
Improve data communication encryption method between
EV and EVSE [YYL11].
ET8
Deploy a power usage monitoring program to recognize
EV charging pattern and identify abnormal usage pattern[HST18];
A stronger authentication process to verify the
EV identity[MXD13].
ET9 Use multisignature method to authorize EV charging;[Bol03].
ET10 Use multisignature method to authorize EV charging;[Bol03].
Continued on next page
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Table 4.6 – Continued from previous page
Scenarios Mitigation Act
ET11
A stronger authentication process to access the database[ZL12];
Improve data encryption method[ALF14];
Use multisignature method to authorize EV charging;[Bol03];
Enable user to dispute the abnormal charging event and
re-issue an EV ID.
ET12
Design resilient communication paths for EV identity
verification.
ET13
Design resilient communication paths for EV identity
verification;
Use an alternative authentication method to verify EV
identity.
ET14
Design resilient communication paths for EV identity
verification;
Use an alternative authentication method to verify EV
identity.
ET15
A stronger authentication mechanism for configuring
charging management system [LNZ14];
Require EV users’ authorization for discharging;
Deploy a circuit breaker to avoid over reverse power
flow to the grid.
ET16
A stronger authentication mechanism for configuring
charging management system[LNZ14];
Fault-detection scheme for an unusual charging load[HST18];
Set an upper limit of EV charging load;
Deploy a circuit breaker to protect distribution transformer.
ET17 Secure the access to the EVSE.
ET18 Secure the access to the EVSE.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents a comprehensive cyber-physical system vulnerabilities analysis for the
EV charging domain. We analyze the UCLA WinSmartEVTM charging network and identify
the potential attack vectors and its attack surface. Since the cyber-security issue is an unfair
advantage for hackers as they can choose the time and place of battle and attack only a single
weak point of the system, understand the weakness and strengthen the protection scheme is
vital of importance to secure the network. Therefore, we review the potential attack types to
the system weakness and discuss their impacts. Eighteen ET failure scenarios are presented
and categorized based on the attack-impact causality. We also conduct a risk assessment for
each scenario and rank them in order to prioritize the remediation effort and allocate security
resources accordingly. The major challenge of the security and privacy of an EV charging
network would be EV authentication, user authorization, and communication encryption.
The best strategy to secure the system is to increase the attacking cost until it outweighs
the value of the attack. However, the potential attacks are included but not limited to
the above mentioned eighteen scenarios. While we try to shorten the attack surface, the
attackers may still strike the system via the weakness. In addition to improving system
security, resiliency is critical when the system is compromised. Therefore, more research is
needed for cyber-physical attack detection.
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CHAPTER 5
Anomaly Detection for EV Charging Network
5.1 Overview
With the rapid growth in computer networks and the IoT technology deployment, the in-
formation network and its services are becoming much more complex and vulnerable to
cyber-attacks. Even if a system has been hardened concerning all potential attack vectors, it
is still inevitable that security has flaws. Motivated and well-resourced attackers will always
breach it at some points. Moreover, attackers have the advantages of choosing the time and
the vulnerability to exploit. System intrusion, data breaches, and privacy compromise have
become the major concerns of such attacks. Cybersecurity and anomaly detection have been
widely studied for computer networks but not as much as that for power systems. Studies
have shown that the current US power system is at risk of a major cyberattack that could
possibly result in devastating outcome[NE12, HHT14, Kop15]. EV charging infrastructures
have been widely deployed in the power system to meet the enormously increasing energy
demand [EVA18a]. To properly manage the power consumption, smart charging technol-
ogy is currently under research and development and turns the charging network into an
information-interconnected network. Therefore, the ability to identify potential attacks is
imperative.
Anomaly detection is the process of identifying suspicious events or observations that
do not conform to the typical behavior in the majority of the data. Anomalous data infers
some problems or rare events such as structural defects, equipment malfunctions, or system
intrusions. The connection between anomaly and the causal factors is valuable as it can
diagnose a system condition and identify system faults followed by remedial responses. A
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simple and common way to identify anomalies is to introduce a range of values for a normal
condition. If an observation falls outside this range, it is considered as an anomaly. However,
this hardcoded range values may result in a large number of false alarms or missing alarms,
without considering other system parameters. For example, a false alarm may arise because
of an abnormal high EV charging load, without knowing that the electricity price at that
moment is extremely low. On the other hand, a typical EV charging load does not necessarily
mean that there is no problem in the system, such as a spoofed electricity price suggesting
there is no need to reduce the load.
EV charging management system controls and schedules EV load according to the mea-
surements of local building load, solar generation, and dynamic electricity price. Within
this information network, any replaced and modified data by an attacker will disrupt the
EV charging schedule or even cause damage to the electrical grid. Those measurements
are correlated under genuine circumstances, while compromised measurement disturbs the
correlations. This chapter discusses the correlation of pair-wise measures within the EV
charging network and analyzes the differences in normal and abnormal circumstances.
5.2 Literature Review
Anomaly detection has been widely studied in statistics and machine learning due to an
increasing concern on information network security. Anomaly detection techniques can be
classified into four categories, which are classification, clustering, statistical, and information
theory [AMH16]. The application fields range from intrusion detection, fault detection, fraud
detection, system condition monitoring, and event detection in sensor networks. Each class
of the approaches has the strength based on the need of the application.
Surprisingly few studies have so far been made at anomaly detection for smart EV charg-
ing network. To ensure a smart EV charging system’s reliability and guarantee the quality
of the service output, a monitoring system that can detect anomalies and diagnose system
faults is desirable. [Ger17] proposed a method to monitor the system status and a thresh-
olding scheme to detect anomalies. [HLV03] introduced a Robost SVM (RSVM) method to
76
improve the detection accuracy by filtering the false-positive incidents. [KTK02] presented
a statistical-based approach to detect anomalous network traffic. The above methods re-
quire to learn a universal and reliable threshold to raise alarms for anomalies, which may
be difficult for a complex information network. Information theory provides an approach to
evaluate and characterize the property of a system data, such as information gain [LLL19]
and correlation analysis [CZC16, IML16]. A system profile is then built based on those
properties, and anomalies can be identified by analyzing the pattern changes of the profile.
For example, [CZC16, IML16] discovered the stable and significant correlations within a
system under genuine circumstances so that the compromised measurements, which disrupt
the correlations, can be captured. To efficiently analyze multiple pair-wise correlations at
the same time, partitioning the time-series measurement data into segments can be helpful
[RR06]. Based on the time-series partitioning approach, [HNB19] has developed a power-
ful and efficient way to analyze system-wise correlations, which is called Greedy Gaussian
Segmentation (GGS) algorithm. The algorithm is formulated as a covariance-regularized
maximum likelihood problem, dividing the multivariate time-series over which the data is
well explained as independent samples. It is assumed that in each segment, the mean and
covariance are constant and unrelated to information from other segments. Therefore, the
anomalous data, in which the mean and covariance are peculiar, can be identified and marked
out as a segment.
The smart charging here has taken the dynamic electricity price, building load, and solar
generation into consideration to minimize the EV charging cost and net load variation. In
this chapter, an information theory-based anomaly detection method is proposed here, and
the GGS algorithm is applied to analyze the pair-wise correlations among EV charging load,
building load, dynamic electricity price, and solar generation.
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5.3 EV Charging Invariant Network and Anomaly Detection
5.3.1 System Overview
As shown in Fig. 5.1, the EV control center schedules the charging according to the meter
data from the building and the solar power system as well as the dynamic electricity price
from a utility. The optimization function of the scheduling is formatted as a quadratic
program, and the objectives are to reduce charging costs and total load variance, as described
in Chapter 3. To recap, there is a weighting factor α in (3.6) that controls the trade-off
between mitigating net load variance and charging cost reduction. Table 5.1 demonstrate
the impact of α to the charging scheduling algorithm.
Table 5.1: The impact of α to the EV charging scheduling algorithm
α Value % Peak Reduction % Cost Reduction
5 20.4 3.7
10 20.5 1.1
20 21.62 3.05
50 17.64 0
100 18.17 2.4
500 19.55 7.80
1000 19.30 10.60
5000 12.37 13.91
10000 4.53 18.12
For the value smaller than 50, α does not have a significant impact to the algorithm.
For α > 50 while increasing the values, the percentage of the charging cost reduces at the
expense of increasing the net load variation. Here α = 1000 is selected for the EV charging
system.
Under this framework, there exists a set of pair-wise correlations among the components
which is shown by the yellow dotted lines. The goal is to characterize the EV charging
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correlation network under regular operation so that one can identify the abnormal state
which disturbs these correlations.
$
$
Communication
Correlation
Figure 5.1: EV Charging Network
Real EV charging data with 7,994 records collected from UCLA campus was used here.
The EV charging station is consisted with 7 level-2 EVCIs with a maximum charging rate
7 kW for each. We also implemented the real data of building load and solar generation
from Cornell University [EM19], and the dynamic electricity price from ISO New England
[Eng19]. To fit the charging station model, the building load and solar power were scaled to
25 kW in average and 10 kW, respectively. Unfortunately, smart building load in response to
dynamic electricity prices was not available. To obtain this data we simulated an intelligent
building load based on the data retrieved from Cornell University, with an assumption that
20% of the load are controllable and can be reallocated to a different point in time according
to the dynamic pricing signal. The formulation of GGS algorithm is described in the next
section.
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5.3.2 Greedy Gaussian Segmentation (GGS) Algorithm
This section provides a brief review of the GGS algorithm. The details can be find in the
reference [HNB19]. As illustrated in Fig. 5.2, considering a given time series x1, ..., xT ∈ Rn,
the goal is find K break points (b1, ..., bK) to divide the time series into K + 1 segments,
with the means and covariances
µ(1),..., µ(K+1), Σ(1),..., Σ(K+1)
in each segment between the breakpoints. It is assumed that the mean and covariance in
each segment are constant and unrelated to that in all other segments. In other words, the
x′ts are independent samples with xt ∼ N (µ(t),Σ(t)), where the mean µ(t) and covariance Σ(t)
only change at the break points.
The breakpoints must satisfy
1 = b0 < b1 < · · · < bK < bK+1 = T + 1,
and the means and covariances are given by
(µt,Σt) = (µ
(i),Σ(i)), bi−1 ≤ bi, i = 1, ..., K
where t and i denote time t and segment i, respectively.
Dimension 1
Dimension n
Dimension 2
b0 b1 b2 b3 bk-1 bk+1bk
t = 1, . . . ,T
𝜇(")Σ(") 𝜇($)Σ($) 𝜇(%)Σ(%) 𝜇(&)Σ(&) 𝜇(&'")Σ(&'")
Figure 5.2: Segmented Gaussian model
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The log-likelihood of the data x1, ..., xT under the segmented Gaussian model (SGM) is
formulated as
`(b, µ,Σ) =
K+1∑
i=1
`(i)
(
bi−1, bi, µ(i),Σ
(i)
)
, (5.1)
where b = (b1, ..., bk), µ = (µ
(1), ...µ(K+1)), Σ = (Σ(1), ...,Σ(K+1)), and
`(i)
(
bi−1, bi, µ(i),Σ
(i)
)
= −1
2
bi−1∑
t=bi−1
(xt − µ(i))T (Σ(i))−1(xt − µ(i))
− bi − bi−1
2
(
log(det Σ(i)) + n log(2pi))
)
.
Note that bi − bi−1 is the length of the ith segment.
To avoid the errors due to more dimension than samples in a segment, a covariance-
regularized log-likelihood is formulated as
φ(b, µ,Σ) = `(b, µ,Σ)− λ
K+1∑
i=1
Tr(Σ(i))−1
=
K+1∑
i=1
(
`(i)
(
bi−1, bi, µ(i),Σ
(i)
)
− λ
K+1∑
i=1
Tr(Σ(i))−1
)
, (5.2)
where λ ≤ 0 is a regularization parameter and K is fixed. The analytical solutions for µ and
Σ are
µ(i) =
1
bi − bi−1
bi−1∑
t=bi−1
xt (5.3)
Σ(i) = S(i) +
λ
bi − bi−1 I, (5.4)
where
S(i) =
1
bi − bi−1
bi−1∑
t=bi−1
(xt − µ(i))(xt − µ(i))T .
Therefore, the maximum covariance-regularized log-likelihood of (5.2) can be expressed
as
maximize − 1
2
K+1∑
i=1
ψ(bi−1, bi), (5.5)
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where
ψ(bi−1, bi) =
(
(bi − bi−1)log
(
det
(
S(i) − λ
bi − bi−1 I
))
− λTr
(
S(i) − λ
bi − bi−1 I
)−1)
,
and the variable set of b = (b1, ..., bk) is to be chosen to maximize the objective function
(5.5).
To find the optimal break points (bi), GGS algorithm along with a split subroutine
Split(bi−1, bi) are implemented. Split(bi−1, bi) screens the values between the segment bi−1
and bi, and determines the optimal t that optimize ψ(bi−1, t) + ψ(t, bi). The GGS algorithm
is illustrated in Fig. 5.3. The alogrithm loops over from i = 1 to i = K + 1 and adds the
optimal break point in each loop. Adding the point is followed by relabeling the point and
points adjustment until all K break points are acquired.
b0 = 0 b1 = T+1Split(b0,b1)
b0 = 0 b2 = T+1b1
Split(b0,b1) Split(b0,b1)
b0 = 0 b3 = T+1b2
Split(b2,b3)
b1
Split(b1,b2)Split(b0,b1)
b0 = 0 bK+1 = T+1b2b1 b3
(1)
(2), (3)
(4), (5)
Add a break point between b0 and b1 by the 
split subroutine.
Relabel the breakpoints.
Split bi-1 and bi , only add the break point that 
increase 𝜓 the most.
Relabel the breakpoints.
Adjust the break points: 
*add a point ti by Split(bi-1,bi+1),  if bi ≠ ti , set 
bi = ti.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Repeat the process (3)-(5) until K break 
points are added.
Figure 5.3: GGS algorithm
5.3.3 Validation and Parameters Selection
The λ and K in (5.5) is determined by running a 10-fold cross-validation. For each fold, 10%
of the samples are selected randomly as the test set, and the remaining 90% are the training
set. The averaged log-likelihood results versus different K values by the GGS algorithm for
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test and training sets were compared. The comparisons with different λ values are presented
in Fig. 5.4. When λ = 10−3 and λ = 10−2, the log-likelihood values drop significantly after
K = 2 and K = 1, respectively. The divergence of the log-likelihood values indicates a
overfitting of model. For λ = 1, the curve stops at K = 5 because there is no breakpoint can
be found to increase the log-likelihood. For λ = 10−1, the log-likelihood remains the same
after K = 5. For GGS to model time-series data, small K and large λ are preferable because
they make the model simpler and less sensitive to noise. Therefore, K = 5, and λ = 10−1
would be reasonable choices for the purpose.
0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of breakpoints (K)302520151050Log-Likelihood ( = 10 3) Training Set Test Set0 2 4 6 8 10Number of breakpoints (K)543210Log-Likelihood ( = 10 2)
0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of breakpoints (K)1.31.21.11.00.90.80.70.60.5Log-Likelihood ( = 10 1) 0 2 4 6 8 10Number of breakpoints (K)1.31.21.11.00.90.80.70.60.5Log-Likelihood ( = 1)
Figure 5.4: 10-fold cross validation with different K and λ
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5.4 Result and Discussion
Smart EV charging control enhances the correlation among the EV charging load, building
load, solar generation, and dynamic electricity price. The following figures present the
comparison between coordinated and uncoordinated EV charging control, in terms of system-
wise correlation.
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Figure 5.5: Time series for uncorrdinated EV charging
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Figure 5.6: Mean, standard deviation(Std), and correlation for uncorrdinated EV charging
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Figure 5.7: Time series for corrdinated EV charging
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Figure 5.8: Mean, standard deviation(Std), and correlation for corrdinated EV charging
The correlations shown in Fig. 5.6 and Fig. 5.8, following changes are noticed:
• EV-Building becomes negative correlated (0.15 to -0.4).
• EV-Solar becomes slightly positive correlated (0.05 to 0.2).
• EV-Price correlation has little to no different change (0.1 to 0.2).
• Building-Solar becomes slightly negative to no correlated (0.5 to -0.1).
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• Building-Price becomes negative correlated 0.2 to -0.4.
• Solar-Price remains unchanged around 0.1.
The correlation of EV-Building changes more than EV-Price because the charging schedul-
ing algorithm weighs more on reducing load variance than the price effect. Building-Solar
becomes uncorrelated because building control only considers the price. The positive cor-
relation found for the uncoordinated load may be because people tend to use more air-
conditioners when it is hot during the summer.
To simulate anomalous data, the data of dynamic pricing, building load, EV load, and
solar generation are falsified, with some fake data points inserted randomly. The following
subsections present the result of anomaly detection by running the GGS algorithm.
5.4.1 Detecting False Pricing Data
Since the EV charging scheduling and building control consider dynamic electricity price,
false pricing data injection may affect the EV charging schedule as well as building load.
As Fig. 5.9 and Fig. 5.10shown, two fake pricing data inserted were identified (Anomaly
1 and anomaly 3). However, there is a false alarm (Anomaly 2) being raised due to a
normal drop in the price. The correlation changes comparison among the three anomalies is
shown in Fig. 5.11. As expected, Building-Price correlation changes because the building is
controlled according to untampered price. For EV-Building, the correlations change because
EV charging is encouraged due to the fake low price for Anomaly 1 and Anomaly 3. Anomaly
2 is identified because there is no EV charging at that period, and it happens to have a price
drop. With a normal decrease in price, EV and building load would both increase and thus
weaken the negative correlation. But a false decrease price further strengthens the negative
correlation because building load does not respond to the false price. The increase in EV
load due to the false price makes a negative EV-Solar correlation, while the normal price
drop does not affect this correlation. EV-Price correlation should be no change since EV
is controlled based on the false price in the same way as the untampered price. However,
over-induced EV charging can make a significant effect, as shown in EV-Price correlation
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change for Anomaly 1. Building-Solar correlation is irrelevant to this scenario.
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Figure 5.9: Time series with some false pricing data inserted
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Figure 5.10: Detecting correlation changes due to false price
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Figure 5.11: Correlation values change from the previous segment for the three identified
anomalies
5.4.2 Detecting False Building Load Data
Falsified building load will affect the EV charging schedule heavily and result in the unex-
pected peak of EV load. Therefore it is important to identify any tampered building load
data.Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.13 shows the detection of two anomalies. Anomaly 1 is a natural
system anomaly, while Anomaly 2 is due to a tampered building load. The comparison of
the correlation changes for the two anomalies is illustrated in Fig. 5.14. As shown in the
figure, the changes of the two anomalies behaved differently. While the natural anomaly
strengthens its original correlations, the tampered data induced anomalies change the direc-
tion of the correlations for most of the pair-wise relationships. For example, the EV-Building
relationship for Anomaly 2 changes from a steady negative correlation to a weak positive
correlation. Also, the fake building load makes it more correlated to solar generation, which
does not make sense since the building control does not consider solar power.
88
Day1 Day5 Day10 Day15 Day20 Day25 Day30
0
10
20
30
40
Po
w
er
 (k
W
) EV (kW)
Building (kW)
Solar (kW)
-2.50
0.00
2.50
5.00
7.50
10.00
M
ea
n 
(c
en
t/k
W
h)
Price ($)
Anomaly 1 Anomaly 2
Figure 5.12: Time series with some false building load data inserted
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Figure 5.13: Detecting correlation changes due to false building load data
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Figure 5.14: Correlation values change from the previous segment for the two identified
anomalies
5.4.3 Detecting False EV Charging Load
While an EV charging schedule can be misled by false electricity price and false building
load, EV charging load could even be altered by hacking into the system. Since under
such attack, the EV load is unlikely to correlate to the other time-series data, the proposed
detection method using the concept of the invariant network has the potential to identify this
system intrusion. The correlations that are related to EV should be a focus. Fig. 5.15 and
Fig. 5.16 show three identified anomalies. In fact, Anomaly 1 and Anomaly 3 were because
of the tempered EV charging loads, and Anomaly 2 was a natural anomaly, which was the
result of a drop in electricity price, and no EV charging happened at the same time. The
analysis of the correlations change for the three anomalies are shown in Fig. 5.17. For EV-
Building, both Anomaly 1 and Anomaly 3 change from strong negative correlations to strong
positive correlations. This is because the tempered EV loads increase while the building load
is increasing. For EV-Solar, Anomaly 1 drops to zero because the false EV charging occurs
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at the time without solar generation; Anomaly 3 increases to positive correlation because
the false EV charging increases while solar generation is increasing. For EV-Price, Anomaly
1 remains at the same level of the correlation, while Anomaly 3 drops to a strong negative
correlation because of the same trend of the pricing and EV load in that period. The
three correlations discussed above for Anomaly 2 all changes to zero because there is no EV
charging at the time of a significant drop in price. The rest correlations are less relevant to
false EV loads detection.
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Figure 5.15: Time series with EV charging load being altered
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Figure 5.16: Detecting correlation changes due to anomalous EV charging events
91
10.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-1
EV-Building EV-Solar EV-Price Building-Solar Building-Price Solar-Price
Co
rre
la
tio
n
Anomaly 1 Anomaly 2 Anomaly 3
Figure 5.17: Correlation values change from the previous segment for the three identified
anomalies
The results have demonstrated the capability to identify false pricing and building load
data injection, and EV load manipulation, based on the steady correlations among the time
series. 123 compromised events were issued and 112 were identified. Precision/Recall metric
is used to evaluate this model, as shown in Fig. 5.18 below.
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Figure 5.18: Precision/Recall Metric
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Precision refers to the percentage of the predicted positives that are true positives, and
recall refers to the percentage of real positives being identified correctly. The definitions
precision, recall, and accuracy are defined as follows:
Precision =
TruePositives
Total# of predicted positives
=
TruePositives
TruePositives+ False Positives
,
Recall =
TruePositives
Total# of actual positives
=
TruePositives
TruePositives+ FalseNegatives
,
Accuracy =
TruePositives+ TrueNegatives
Total Population
.
The precision, recall, and accuracy for the detection model are 84%, 91.1%, and 94.3%,
respectively.
However, because solar-related correlations are relatively weak in this experiment setup,
the detection of false solar generation data is not significant. This is due to a data limitation.
First off, solar and electricity price is not correlated in the region of New England, where the
solar penetration is not yet to impact the electricity price. Solar-electricity price correlation
is more significant in California. According to CAISO, the higher penetration of solar results
in a stronger correlation between solar generation and electricity price (∼ -0.5). Secondly,
Smart building load is controlled according to electricity price only and thus is not correlated
to solar generation. More solar-related correlations can be found in a more extensive and
more complex EV charging network, and they can be utilized to detect the anomalies due
to tampered solar data.
5.4.4 Identifying the Sources of Anomalies
As seen in the previous subsections for the detection, natural changes in correlation are
sometimes identified as anomalies because they rarely happen. There is a need for a su-
pervised machine learning approach to distinguish natural and malicious cases by using the
correlation set as features, where the correlation set C , [EV-Building, EV-Solar, EV-Price,
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Building-Solar, Building-Price, Solar-Price]T . In addition, based on the observation, the
correlation changes of the anomalies due to tampered measurement are much larger than
that for natural anomalies as shown in the Fig. 5.11, Fig. 5.14, and Fig. 5.17. Therefore, a
Euclidean distance (D) between a correlation set (C) to the averaged correlation set under
normal operation (Cmean) is taken as an extra feature, where D is defined as:
D , ‖C − Cmean‖ =
√
‖C‖2 + ‖Cmean‖2 − 2C · Cmean.
Each segment by the GGS model can be described as an 8-tuple: (C,D, class), where C
has six elements, D has one element, and class is the label of the source of the attack (class ∈
[Normal, tampered price, tampered building load, tampered EV load]). 570 segments were
labeled, including 470 normal segments, 37 segments due to tampered price, 34 segments due
to tampered building load, and 41 segments due to tampered EV load. Because of the limited
labeled dataset, a cross-validation testing method is conducted. For each cross-validation
trial, 10% of the labeled data was selected randomly as a test set, and the remaining 90%
as a training set.
A weighted k-nearest neighbor (kNN) classifier (weight = 1
distance
) is introduced to classify
the sources of attacks. For a new sample, the kNN classifier finds its closest k labeled
samples and classifies the sample by the majority vote of these k nearest neighbors. The
closer neighbor has a higher weight on its vote. Fig. 5.19 shows the intuition for kNN
classification. k = 2 is chosen because it has the best classification accuracy in comparison
to the other numbers of k under 30-trials of cross-validation testing, as shown in Fig. 5.20.
The curves of k = 1 and k = 2 overlap because they are equivalent.
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Figure 5.19: Intuition for kNN classification with k=2
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Figure 5.20: The comparison of classification accuracy with different numbers of k
Fig. 5.21 shows the result of kNN classification for one of the eighty trials. The numbers on
the diagonal are the number of correctly labeled incidents. There are still a few misclassified
cases. For example, the figure shows one attack due to a fake EV load was labeled as a
fake price. The misclassification rate for the detected anomalies is 0.17 on average for the
eighty-trials testing. The result for the cross-validation testing is shown in Fig. 5.22. The
averaged Precision, Recall, and Accuracy are 96.8%, 77.2%, and 94.4%, respectively.
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Figure 5.21: Confusion matrix for the kNN classification
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Figure 5.22: Mean prediction Precision, Recall, and Accuracy for 80-trials cross-validation
testing
5.5 Conclusion
This section presents a novel strategy to detect system anomalies. Usually, the conventional
detection methods characterize the measurements according to their typical behavior and
identify the one that behaves anomalously. This kind of approach defines a hard-coded
range based on the empirical rule and considers the data points lying outside of this range
as anomalies. However, very often, the data points located within the normal range can be
anomalous, and the points locate outside can be healthy. Therefore, using the conventional
approach can result in many false-negative and false-positive cases.
The GGS algorithm examines all system measurements concurrently, take them as a
whole entity by formulating it as a multivariate maximum log-likelihood problem. The
method divides the time-series data into several segments, intending to isolate anomalous
data. Under typical operation, each measurement has steady correlations with the other
measurements. Any unusual event that disturbs the correlations will be detected as an
anomaly. This can be more accurate because anomalies are identified by the result of many
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correlation changes instead of a single determinant. In addition, a kNN classifier is applied
to find the source of an anomaly upon detection. While different tampered data results in
different correlation changes, the value of correlations can provide insight for tracing the
source of the intrusion.
In this information interconnected era, any cyber-attack can result in adverse conse-
quences, such as system malfunction, property damage, privacy compromise, or even threat-
ening lives. Cybersecurity becomes paramount that should be taken seriously. Although an
enlarger information network makes it more vulnerable to cyber threats, while the intercon-
nected information working collaboratively, making use of their correlation can be a great
idea to defense the cyber threats.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion & Future Work
The current electrical grid is undergoing a revolutionary transition toward an environmental-
friendly, energy-efficient, and information interconnected smart network. In response to the
critical energy and environmental challenges, humongous advanced technologies have been
developed to support this transition. Utilities, government, and regulators are working col-
laboratively to achieve the maximum benefits. The behavior of the new energy users is the
most critical factor, with the vision that customers will be able to manage the energy usage
accordingly. Therefore, customers can save energy costs, the government can reach energy
reduction, and all of us can benefit from lower carbon emissions and a cleaner environment.
The surge of EV to the world and the integration to the distribution grid is an excellent
example of smart energy utilization since EVs have a great potential to provide grid services
and stabilize the electrical grid. Yet, many technical challenges need to be resolved for EV-
grid integration. As EVs are powered by electricity, a massive charging demand may add
up the power consumption an result in many grid problems. Accordingly, smart charging
scheduling strategies are developed, intending to reallocate energy consumption. However,
the biggest challenge to reach the optimal charging schedule is the stochasticity of the charg-
ing behavior, including the time to charge and the energy demand. Therefore, Chapter 2
provides an improved prediction method, namely the ensemble predicting algorithm (EPA),
to tackle the uncertainty of EV users’ behavior and leverage the performance of EV charging
scheduling. In this chapter, data sparsity/entropy (R) as an information property taken as is
defined to classify different charging patterns. The EPA can thus select the proper methods
according to R and make a more accurate prediction. Nonetheless, with the capability of EV
scheduling, charging stations that are working independently may not achieve the maximum
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benefit of what EVs can provide. Therefore, Chapter 3 presents a scalable and straightfor-
ward EV charging scheduling algorithm that can be easily adapted to a distributed control
scheme. In this manner, more EVs within the distribution grid can work together to make
a significant impact. For future work, a smart charging strategy for a distributed control
scheme will be studied to manage the collaboration of different charging stations. Also, the
extra EV charging load will broadly impact the original dynamic electricity pricing mecha-
nism, which is taken as the input of the charging algorithm in this dissertation. This should
be further studied for better EV-grid integration.
The smart charging control allows EV to be externally controlled for integration into
the whole power system and provide grid services. However, the expanded communication
network of EV charging systems become more vulnerable to potential cyber threats. Chapter
4 discusses the possible cyberattacks against an EV charging system and presents the result
of the vulnerability analysis and risk assessment, intending to create a generalizable and
comprehensive solution. Inevitably, there always exists a system weakness that can be
exploited for a cyberattack. Thus, anomaly detection is critical to protect the system by
handling the attacks quickly. For this reason, Chapter 5 demonstrates a novel approach
to detect the EV charging system anomalies. The proposed method analyzes the system-
wise correlations, characterizes the invariant-correlation network, and discovers the unusual
correlation changes. The method can provide more accurate detection because anomalies are
identified by the result of many correlation changes instead of a single determinant factor.
Furthermore, a weighted kNN classifier is applied to distinguish natural and malicious
cases, making use of the correlation values as critical features. The results also show the
potential to classify and identify the source of the attack by the kNN classifier. However, due
to the data limitation, such as a relatively small scale of the labeled dataset and weak solar-
related correlation, the current experimental setup does not detect tampered solar attacks
well. For future work, an expanded EV charging network that involves more components, as
well as more solar-related correlations, will be examined to verify the detection functionality
and accuracy. Also, with a larger labeled dataset, neural network can be trained to improve
anomaly classification performance.
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In summary, this dissertation presents the strategy for EV-smart grid integration, in the
aspects of EV load modeling and prediction, charging management and scheduling, and the
cybersecurity discussion and anomaly detection. As we have witnessed the evolution of the
electrical grid, the rapidly growing number of EVs, and the related-technology advancement,
this work contributes to addressing the current technical issues and paving the essential step
into the future.
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